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I. INTRODUCTION
Payment systems' have allured great American scholars, such as Joseph
Story,2 Grant Gilmore,3 William Prosser, and Karl Llewellyn.4 Although the
classical romance for "notes and instruments" 5 has receded, the study of
payment systems continues to generate passion and fervency. Professors strive
to convey,6 and students wrestle to master,7 the elusive language of older
payment systems borrowed from defunct times of previous centuries. Professor
James White, an eminent scholar of commercial law, analogizes Article 3 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)-the codified law of negotiable
instruments-to "a huge machine assembled by a mad inventor and comprised
of assorted sprockets, gears, levers, pulleys, and belts." 8 Article 3 is indeed a
linguistic maze; it articulates payment precepts in confusingly intertwined
phrases.9 The same party may have three or four technical names, 10 adding
1. In this Article, I define a payment system as a money substitute that the market uses and
the law authorizes to make payments for buying goods and services and for borrowing money. See
LARY LAWRENCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO PAYMENT SYSTEMS 3 (1997).
2. Ali Khan, The Evolution o(fMoney: A Story of Constitutional Nullification, 67 U. CIN. L.
REV. 393, 416 n.107 (1999). Joseph Story was the first great American scholar of payment
systems.
3. Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 441, 445-46 (1979). Gilmore's work remains one of the classic articles of American legal
literature.
4. Gilmore, Prosser, and Llewellyn were the original academic giants who drafted the
Uniform Commercial Code. See Samuel J. M. Donnelly & Mary Ann Donnelly, Commercial Law
is a Humanism, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 277, 278 (2003).
5. Karl Llewellyn announced that he had fallen in love with negotiable instruments. Karl N.
Llewellyn, Meet Negotiable Instruments, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 299 (1944).
6. Professor Douglas Whaley is a legend in teaching the teachers of payment systems. He
comments on the hazards and the techniques of teaching commercial law. See Douglas J. Whaley,
Teaching Law: Thoughts on Retirement, 68 OMO ST. L.J. 1387, 1398 (2007) (noting that payment
systems was known as one of the "dogs" of the curriculum).
7. See, e.g., Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, The Check Clearing/lbr the 21st Century Act-A
Wrong Turn in the Road to Improvement of'the U.S. Payments System, 85 NEB. L. REV. 52, 61
(2006) ("[Law] students tend not to take the courses with labels like 'bills and notes,' 'negotiable
instruments,' 'commercial paper,' or 'payment systems."'). Consequently, the bar has little actual
or creative knowledge of this area of the law. See id.
8. James J. White, Some Petty Complaints About Article Three, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1315,
1315 (1967).
9. For example, a person entitled to enforce the instrument could be a holder or a nonholder
with the rights of a holder; could be a lawful or wrongful holder; could be in possession; or could
not be in possession. The very notion that even a thief of a bearer instrument can be a person
entitled to enforce the instrument is baffling. Will any court accept such a daring theory that the
thief is a person entitled to enforce the instrument? See U.C.C. § 3-301 (2002).
10. For example, an accommodation party might also be an anomalous indorser and
secondary obligor. U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(17), 3-205 cmt. 3.
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PAYMENT SYSTEMS
needless strain to clarity and analysis. Even federal courts stumble to use Article
3 definitions correctly." The federal law containing new payment systems is no
less obtuse. Riddled with swarming provisos and exceptions, its long-winded
sections sprawl over pages. 12 Attempts to create a uniform payment code have
failed to replace the scattered payment systems. 13
While the romance for payment systems is honorable, 14 clarity demands
that payment systems be viewed as a legally regulated industry in which
financial institutions provide professional services to transfer monies from
account holders to payees. Because, historically, payment systems preceded the
emergence of financial institutions, payment systems were seldom viewed asS 15
payment services. Now that the bulk of consumer and business payments are
made through financial institutions, payment systems are inseparably tied to• • • 16
financial institutions. Accordingly, payment systems must be analyzed as
payment services that financial institutions provide to consumers, businesses,
and other entities.' 7 When a person opens a deposit account with a bank, for
example, the bank agrees to provide payment services as per the account
holder's instructions. Similarly, a credit card account is a service account that
11. The Supreme Court, for example, once used the word "maker" to describe the drawer of
the check. Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992) (citing U.C.C. § 3-104(1)-(2)(b) (1990)).
The technical term "maker" is used for a person who undertakes to pay a promissory note, not a
check. See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(5) (2002); see also Woodruff v. Miss., 162 U.S. 291, 303 (1896)
(using the word maker accurately). More recent cases have also used the word maker inaccurately.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Ali, 561 F. Supp. 2d 269, 276 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (referring to the "maker of the
check").
12. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2006) (spanning nine pages of the Code).
13. The Uniform New Payments Code (UNPC), drafted by the American Law Institute and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was a complete failure
because no jurisdiction was willing to adopt it. The UNPC was abandoned. See Ronald J. Mann,
Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Infbrmation Age, 93 GEO. L.J. 633, 634 n.4 (2005).
14. Law professors even quote popular literature to light up the romance of payment
systems. See, e.g., Curtis Nyquist, A Spectrum Theory of Negotiability, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 897, 898
n.5 (1995) (quoting dialogue from the novel True Grit in which a character mentions reading
Daniels on Negotiable Instruments).
15. See James Steven Rogers, The Myth of Negotiability, 31 B.C. L. REV. 265, 272 (1990).
Needless to say, banks provide numerous services that may or may not be payment services, for
example, safe deposits for storing valuables are not payment services.
16. Policy Statement-The Federal Reserve in the Payments System, 55 Fed. Reg. 11,648,
at 11,649 (Mar. 29, 1990), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/PaymentSystems/
pricing/frpaysys.htm ("The smooth functioning of markets for virtually every good and service is
dependent upon the smooth functioning of banking and financial markets, which in turn is
dependent upon the integrity of the nation's payments system.").
17. Millions of people, however, have little or no access to financial services. See, e.g.,
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 123 (2004) (citing Arthur B.
Kennickell et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Results from the 1998 Survey of"
Consumer Finances, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 9-11 (2000)) ("[They] lack the most basic financial
tool, a bank account.").
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the financial institution operates to pay the cardholder's payment orders against
a revolving loan.'
8
Checks, credit cards, and debit cards are the devices used to order, receive,
and execute payment services.' 9 For centuries, negotiable instruments-
promissory notes, bills of exchange, and drafts-served as universal payment
devices that needed no financial institution to initiate or complete payments.
20
Negotiable instruments, sometimes called commercial papers, continue to
circulate in national and international markets to pay for goods and services and
to transfer monies. Most instruments, however, are now processed through
21financial institutions. In the past few decades, credit cards and debit cards
have gradually begun competing with, and even replacing, negotiable
22instruments. These new payment devices are essentially payment services that
the financial institutions extend to millions of natural and juridical persons.
Currently made out of plastic, credit cards and debit cards are rapidly turning
into electronic numbers while negotiable instruments are still tied to the paper
23attributes of writing, signature, and possession. It is only a matter of time,
18. As discussed later, the credit card joins two distinct services: lending and payment. See
infra text accompanying notes 160-61. The same bank that lends revolving credit also agrees to
make payments. See Teri Rebecca Daniel, Improvident Extension oIf Credit as an Extension of
Unconscionability: Discover Bank v. Owens and a Debtor's Rights Against Credit Card
Companies, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 435, 447-48 (2006).
19. Gregory E. Maggs, New Payment Devices and General Principles of Payment Law, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 753, 753 (1997). Professor Maggs mentioned what were new payment
devices in the late 1990s, including stored-value cards and Ecash. Id. at 753-54 These devices
seem to have fizzled away. Professor Maggs's general principles are not the same as the three
principles discussed in this Article. In fact, most of the general principles that Professor Maggs
mentions are subsumed under the theoretical analysis offered here.
20. Rogers, supra note 15. For a historical review of negotiable instruments, see id. at 272-
90. When banks surfaced in the market, the draft drawn on the bank, called a check, was inducted
into negotiable instruments. Khan, supra note 2, at 433; see also JAMES WILLARD HIURST, A
LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1970, at 47 (1983).
21. See generally Geoffrey R. Gerdes et al., Trends in the Use of Payment Instruments in the
United States, 91 FED. RES. BULL. 180 (2005) (discussing the percentage of payment instruments
used in the United States).
22. Id. In the United States, the use of debit cards grew rapidly from 8.3 billion transactions
in 2000 to 15.6 billion transactions in 2003. Id. at 183. The number of credit card transactions grew
from 15.6 billion in 2000 to 19.0 billion in 2003. Id. at 184. The number of checks declined from
41.9 billion in 2000 to 36.6 billion in 2003. Id. at 181. However, checks remained the most used
payment device in 2003. Id.
23. A negotiable instrument, for example, must be in writing and must be signed; a person
must have possession of a negotiable instrument to obtain the holder status. See U.C.C. §§ 3-
103(8), 3-103(12) (2002); see also U.C.C. § 1-201(21) (2001). Although any tangible medium may
be used to write, sign, and deliver a negotiable instrument, paper is the most convenient medium
used in the market. Contrast this with the use of credit cards on the Internet where the cardholder
can buy goods and services by communicating key numbers identifying the card. See RONALD J.
MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 260-70 (3rd ed. 2005).
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however, before the negotiable instruments law 24 will transcend the age of paper
and permit electronic payments. 25 And, as is customary, the market will produce
26even newer payment devices.
For numerous reasons, including safety and efficiency, the market prefers
27 28money substitutes over money for making payments. A buyer rarely
purchases a house, even of modest value, with the actual transfer of money from
the buyer to the seller. Even a payment of a few thousand dollars in Federal
Reserve notes, the money of the United States, is prone to risk and suspicion.
For most of the twentieth century, the check, and not money, has been the
29preferred method of making large payments. Cash transactions were limited to
small amounts. The convenience of credit cards, however, has revolutionized
payment systems; accordingly, credit cards have extensively substituted the
24. Negotiable instruments law includes Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC, Federal Reserve
Board regulations, and case law.
25. Some changes have been made to automate check clearance. See Check Clearing for the
21st Century Act of 2003 (Check 21 Act), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5018 (2006) (allowing for the
electronic truncation of checks for collection); see also Walter A. Effross, Notes on PKI and
Digital Negotiability: Would the Cybercourier Carry Luggage?, 38 Jt RIMETRICS J. 385, 386
(1998) (proposing the use of public key cryptography (PKI) to create digital negotiable
instruments).
26. See generally Khan, supra note 2, at 397 (explaining the evolution of money and money
substitutes).
27. Money is defined as a medium of exchange authorized by a government or an
intergovernmental organization, such as the European Union. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24) (2001).
For the most part, money is territorial. See id. The Euro, however, is regional money. Jan Aart
Scholte, Restructuring Contemporary Democracy, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 315
(2008). Many consumers simultaneously have both credit card debt and cash in hand. This strategy
is justified to meet needs that cannot be charged to the credit card, such as mortgage payments, and
to leave liquid assets ready for emergency situations. See Irina A. Telyukova & Randall Wright, A
Model of Money and Credit, with Application to the Credit Card Debt Puzzle, 75 REV. ECON.
STUD. 629, 630 (2008), available at http://moneyrg.googlepages.com/Telyukovaand
Wright2008.pdf.
28. Kahn, supra note 2, at 393.
29. See id. at 433; see also Geoffrey R. Gerdes & Jack K. Walton, II, The Use of Checks and
Other Noncash Payment Instruments in the United States, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 360, 360-62 (2002),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2002/0802_2nd.pdf (discussing the
statistics regarding the use of checks).
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traditional methods of payment: More recently, the widespread access to the
internet popularized payments by debit cards and other electronic transfers.
31
Each payment system owns its separate law. The language, niceties, and
concepts of modern negotiable instruments law (NIL), though frequently
revised in the past hundred years, continue to carry the burdens of historical
anachronism.32 By contrast, the law of credit cards is new and made in
America. 33 Its language is modern and derived from the banking industry. 34 Its
concepts absorb the tensions between the rights of credit consumers and those
of financial institutions. 35 The law of electronic fund transfers borrows from
both negotiable instruments and credit cards, hybridizing the two laws. Sharing
common features with others, each payment system nonetheless stands
separately in law. In contradistinction to the NIL, electronic payments law
(EPL)36 is primarily federal, codified in the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
37
30. Credit cards have certain systemic advantages that cardholders exploit to pay for goods
and services. First, the payment involves no immediate depletion of cash. Second, users pay no
surcharge fee for using credit cards. Third, the interchange fee, the fee that the merchant's bank
pays to the issuer, is passed on to merchants who distribute it to all account holders, including
those who pay cash, through higher prices of merchandise. Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King, A
Theoretical Analysis of Credit Card Regulation 2-3 (Melbourne Bus. Sch., Working Paper No.
2002-11, 2002), available at http://www.mbs.edu/home/jgans/papers/interchange-RBA.pdf.
31. According to the Federal Reserve Board, the number of checks written nationally has
been declining since the mid-1990s. Federal Reserve Check Services,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/checkservices/default.htm (last visited Jan. 29,
2009). Accordingly, by 2011, the number of check processing locations will be reduced to only
four. Id. Before the decline, Federal Reserve Banks operated forty-five locations. Id.
32. In the nineteenth century, efforts were first made to harmonize the law of negotiable
instruments in the United States. Note, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 11 HARV. L. REV. 187,
188 (1897). Modeled after the English Bills of Exchange Act, the Negotiable Instruments Law was
enacted in New York, Connecticut, Colorado, and Florida. Id.
33. Credit, in a generic sense, has existed from time immemorial. If credit is defined as
deferred payment, credit predates money. See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and
High-Cost Consumer Credit, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 808 (2003).
34. See Daniel, supra note 18.
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006); see also Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic,
Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and its Efjbct on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN.
L. REV. 518, 528-39 (2004) (describing the struggle between consumer groups and the financial
industry in designing regulatory laws).
36. Here EPL means the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2006),
the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (2006), and case law.
37. Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2006). One might
wonder why one payment system is regulated by state law, while the other is regulated by federal
law. One answer is that the law of negotiable instruments has traditionally been state law, whereas
the law of modern payment systems originated at the federal level. Of course, other explanations
are equally valid. For example, the law for credit cards was enacted to regulate a nationwide
concern over lending institution practices marketing unsolicited credit cards to vulnerable
consumers. See Laurie A. Burlingame, Getting to the Truth of'the Matter: Revising the TILA Credit
Card Disclosure Scheme to Better Protect Consumers, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 308, 312
[VOL. 60:425
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Striving to simplify, this Article offers a theoretical analysis of payment
systems. The analysis does not restructure payment rules that regulate old and
new payment devices. Rather, it constructs a common theoretical core of
payment systems. The common core brings together payment rules and places
them in conceptual folders, called the principles of payment systems. Relying
on these principles, the theoretical analysis elucidates how payment rules
deviate, sometimes with scant reason, from one payment system to the other.
Furthermore, the enormity of payment rules can baffle new learners, leaving an
erroneous impression that the study of payment systems is weariful
memorization of black letter law. Nothing is further from the truth. The
common theoretical core-it has been the author's teaching experience-
animates payment systems like no other area of law, knitting the minutiae of
payment rules into an exquisite unity.
38
Stated briefly, the principles of payment systems determine liability. They
are derived from statutes, not contracts. They are mandatory, not optional. They
allocate loss to various parties involved in payment services. They address
questions of fairness and efficiency. They guide legal professionals in resolving
payment disputes. They chart a normative path for future payment systems. The
theoretical study undertaken in this Article reveals that, despite differing
historical origins of payment devices and despite the progression of payment
services from tangible to intangible medium, the legal principles of
authorization, negligence, and dishonor constitute the common core of payment
systems.
First, as Part II suggests, the authorization principle forges a legal relation
between authorization and liability, carrying a powerful idea that authorized
payments may be lawfully charged against the account holder who authorizes
them. This principle is critical to understanding the payment services that
financial institutions provide to consumers and businesses. According to the
principle, no payment must be made unless it is authorized. And no account
holder should be held liable for unauthorized payments. The loss of
unauthorized payments, therefore, must fall on financial institutions. These
(2007); see also Arnold S. Rosenberg, Better than Cash? Global Proliftration of Payment Cards
and Consumer Protection Policy, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 426, 441 (2006) (discussing how
credit cards led to the enactment of TTLA).
38. Karl Llewellyn argued that the best scholarly enterprise is one that combines truth,
beauty, and goodness. Karl N. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautftd, in Law, 9 U. CH-.
L. REV. 224, 247 (1942). This Article does not quite capture Llewellyn's unity, but it certainly
seeks coherence.
39. The financial institutions may allocate loss among themselves in accordance with the
law of warranties. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 4-207 to 4-209 (2002) (providing transfer, presentment,
encoding, and retention warranties).
2008]
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norms constitute the bedrock of the authorization principle that governs
payment services.
Second, Part I argues that the negligence principle encompasses a simple
truth that persons involved in payment services sometimes breach the duty of
care attendant to the authorization principle. In such cases, the authorization
principle is subordinated to the negligence principle. Suppose an account holder
writes a check in a negligent manner so that the amount of the check can be
easily raised, say from $10 to $100. A strict application of the authorization
principle imposes on the account holder a liability of no more than $10, the
amount that the account holder authorized on the check. Under the negligence
principle, however, the account holder is liable for the altered amount of $100
because the account holder's negligence contributed to the alteration of the
check. Likewise, if a bank fails to detect a visible alteration on a check due to its
negligence and pays the altered amount, the loss falls on the negligent bank and
not on the account holder who wrote the check in a careful manner. Hence, the
negligence principle allocates loss to the negligent party.
Third, Part IV examines the dishonor principle, which is also a principle of
liability. The dishonor principle applies to cases where financial institutions
dishonor payments. The principle consists of two distinct parts: rightful
dishonor and wrongful dishonor. A financial institution rightfully dishonors
forged or altered checks. By contrast, wrongful dishonor occurs when a
financial institution dishonors an authorized payment through negligence,
mistake, or malice. Placing a dual duty on financial institutions, the dishonor
principle requires financial institutions to dishonor unauthorized payments but
not to dishonor authorized payments for wrongful reasons. A financial
institution is liable to the account holder for damages if the financial institution
wrongfully dishonors an authorized payment. In an economy where the
maintenance of good credit is a matter of survival for individuals and
businesses, dishonored payments generate negative reports with credit bureaus,
affecting future borrowing, reputation, and employment.
4
0
The principles of payment systems serve several distinct purposes. They
facilitate the study of payment systems and streamline payment services in a
rational and consistent manner. The principles illuminate the advantages and
disadvantages of payment systems that consumers need to know in order to
choose among the available payment services. In practice, lawyers may turn to
these principles to argue cases, particularly if no dispositive rule is available.
Most important, the principles guide judges and lawmakers to contextualize
payment rules within the framework of principles to reach more disciplined,
40. See, e.g., Ali v. Long Beach Acceptance Corp., No. CTV-F-07-1062, 2007 WL 3335015,
at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2007) (consisting of a party arguing that incorrectly reported late payments
have resulted in the denial of credit and employment opportunities).
[VOL. 60:425
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economically efficient, and predictable outcomes in payment disputes.
Moreover, the principles unfold several discrepancies within the law, which
scholars must discuss to guide the evolution of payment systems. Professor
Clayton Gillette has rightfully questioned the wisdom of treating "functionally
equivalent payment devices" differently in both form and substance. 41 Because
markets are constantly searching for safer and more efficient payment services,
future payment systems would greatly benefit from a rigorous application of
these principles.
The principles of payment systems analyzed in this study are not the
42author's invention. They are derived from the law of payment systems.
Accordingly, the study validates each principle with specific references to NIL
and EPL. This anchoring of principles in law demonstrates their rootedness in
legislative will as well as market dynamics. The study exposes that the
application of principles to diverse payment services is uneven because a
payment service may embrace a principle more vigorously than would another
payment service. By exposing such discrepancies, the theoretical analysis
invites legal professionals to deliberate whether payment systems must cultivate
a more uniform application of the principles. Contrariwise, the theoretical
analysis demands that a case be made for the continuation of discordant laws,
explaining that a uniform application of the principles across payment services
is logistically unwise, legally unjust, and economically inefficient.
Finally, to guide the present and future payment systems, Part V of this
Article develops a principled framework and a common vocabulary to
harmonize assorted payment services. The principled framework, a succinct
recapitulation of the three principles, proposes what the law of payment systems
ought to be. The common vocabulary binds diverse payment systems together,
erasing conceptual confusion and terminological variations that occupy the
current payment laws. The principled framework and the common vocabulary
reinforce each other while forging a stable analytical structure that legal
professionals may consider in designing the future course of payment systems.
Should the proposed framework fail to break ground, it will hopefully
commence an instructive conversation of principles that inform the law, logic,
efficiency, and economic underpinnings of payment systems.
41. Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L.
REV. 181, 184 (1996).
42. Over the years the author has taught these principles to hundreds of law students, always
cautioning them, though, that they ought to be careful in analyzing bar questions in terms of these
principles because bar examiners may be looking for more rule-specific answers. But, these
principles help organize the study of payment systems in a more manageable way.
2008]
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II. AUTHORIZATION PRINCIPLE
The authorization principle is the foundation of payment systems. It
constitutes the core of negotiable instruments, credit cards, and electronic fund
43transfers. The authorization principle may be stated in two different ways.
Stated positively, the principle is captured in the maxim: authorization imposes
liability. This means that an account may be lawfully charged for a payment that
the account holder has authorized the financial institution to make. The
principle may also be stated negatively in the maxim: no authorization, no
liability. This means that the financial institution may not charge an account for
a payment that the account holder has not authorized. The two statements,
however, emphasize one and the same point-that payment authorization and
payment liability are interdependent. They coexist as a matter of law.
Jurisprudentially, the authorization principle is the Weberian norm of
empowerment that confers upon persons the power to contract payment services
with financial institutions. 4
A. Negotiable Instruments
The NIL-derived from the English common law stretching back hundreds
of years, 45 codified in Article 3 of the UCC,46 and adopted throughout the
43. This principle also applies to wholesale funds transfers governed by Article 4A of the
UCC. A payment order "is the authorized order of the person identified as sender if that person
authorized the order or is otherwise bound by it under the law of agency." U.C.C. § 4A-202(a)
(1989).
44. Max Weber saw the sociology of law as both coercive and empowering. MAX WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 730, 667 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff trans.,
Bedminster Press 1968). He cited negotiable instruments as one area of law that empowers and
enables persons to construct legal relations. Id. at 668. For a discussion of Weber's idea, see
Richard Swedberg, The Case .br an Economic Sociology of Law, 32 THEORY & SOC'Y 1, 11
(2003).
45. The law of negotiable instruments began to develop in late seventeenth century England
and became quite complex and sophisticated in the next two centuries. JAMES STEVEN ROGERS,
THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 152-53 (1995). In England, the law of
bills of exchange was codified in 1882, known as the Bills of Exchange Act. The Negotiable
Instruments Law, supra note 32. In New York, a similar statute was passed in 1897 as the
Negotiable Instruments Law. Frederick K. Beutel, The Development of State Statutes on
Negotiable Paper Prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 836, 849 (1940).
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (National Conference of
Commissioners) drafted the NIL in 1896, and every American jurisdiction subsequently enacted
the NIL. JAMES J. WHiTE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1, at 2 (5th ed.
2000). The purpose of the NIL was to arrest the chaotic growth of law through diverse and
numerous state courts of the Union. The Negotiable Instruments Law, supra note 32, at 187. The
common law habit of searching the law in cases rather than in statutes frustrated the "unity of the
system" that the drafters of the uniform law intended. WHiTE & SUMMERS, supra. In the 1950s, the
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47 48United States _is founded upon the authorization principle. Each negotiable
instrument has its own unique history. The bill of exchange, known as the draft
49in the United States, is an ancient instrument that developed centuries ago.
National Conference of Commissioners, under the guidance of Professor William Prosser, revised
the NIL and drafted a new law. Id. at 3; see also Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course:
Codification of Form over Intent in Negotiable Instrument, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 363, 416
(2002) ("The task of reworking the N.I.L. was given to Professor William Prosser .. "). The new
law was enacted in the form of Article 3 of the UCC. Id. at 417. In addition to many substantive
changes to the NIL, the law was renamed the law of commercial papers. U.C.C. § 3-101 (1957).
Like the NIL, however, the original Article 3 fell short of a uniform interpretation in fifty
jurisdictions of the United States. WiTE & SUMMERS, supra, § 1, at 4. The case law, using the
same provisions of Article 3, was divided on many issues. See, e.g., Robert F. Ballen et al.,
Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collections, and Other Payment Systems, 43 BuS. LAW.
1305, 1339 (1988) (noting that courts were divided on their interpretation of U.C.C. § 3-419). In
1990, Article 3 was revised, changing its name once again. Now, it is called the law of negotiable
instruments. U.C.C. § 3-101 (2002).
46. U.C.C. art. 3.
47. With New York and South Carolina on board, all fifty states have adopted Revised
Article 3. Thomas C. Baxter Jr. et al., Revised Articles 3 and 4 of'the UCC." Will New York Say
Nix?, 114 BANKING L.J. 219,221 (1997) (describing New York's objections to revised Article 3).
48. The UCC does not mention the authorization principle as such. However, the principle is
present throughout Articles 3 and 4. Consider the following: The law recognizes two kinds of
instruments-notes and drafts. The note is a promissory note with respect to which the maker
undertakes to pay the stated amount, with or without interest, to the bearer or the order of the
payee. U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(12), 3-104(a), (e). The draft is an order with respect to which the drawer
instructs the drawee to pay the amount of the draft to the bearer or to the order of the payee. U.C.C.
§ 3-104(a), (e). The concepts of undertaking and instructing are related to authorization. Under
Article 4, an item when authorized is properly payable. U.C.C. § 4-401(a)(2002).
49. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE 5-13 (1853).
The law is ancient at least with respect to bills of exchange, and seems to have been developed by
the tenth century Middle Eastern commercial community. Id. The Italian merchants of Genoa,
Lucca, Florence, and Venice were the next to use payment instruments similar to the modern bill
of exchange, now known as drafts in the United States. Id. at 9, 13; see also JAMES MATLOCK
OGDEN, THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20 (5th ed. 1947). Gradually, almost all
commercial communities began to use bills of exchange to make payments to sellers located in
foreign countries. A bill of exchange was a three-party instrument where one party, say in Genoa,
ordered another party, say in London, to make payment to a third party. See ROGERS, supra note
45, at 35. This arrangement was particularly useful in times when money was measured in gold
and silver. Thus, an English merchant who bought spices from India would prefer to pay by means
of a bill of exchange rather than taking the risk of "shipping" real money. See id. at 35-36. If the
English merchant had a foreign agent stationed in India, he would simply order the agent to pay
when the seller produced a document (bill of exchange) signed by the English merchant. See
OGDEN, supra, at 21-22. Of course, the English merchant must also tell the agent when to pay and
how much to pay. See Rogers, supra note 15, at 285. If the local agent refused to accept the bill of
exchange, the seller would ask the English merchant to pay directly or make an alternative
arrangement. A merchant would lose credit and credibility if his bills were frequently dishonored
by foreign agents. The bill of exchange was also used for payment in domestic transactions and
was called an "inland bill of exchange." ROGERS, supra note 45, at 101; see also FREDERICK K.
BEUTEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 1391 (7th ed. 1948). If the parties to a bill of exchange
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Likewise, the elementary concept of the promissory note has been around from
time immemorial.50 The check came later as banks were organized to manage
and lend money. 51 The theoretical analysis of payment systems presented in this
were well reputed in a trading community, the bill of exchange would circulate as a money
substitute. See ROGERS, supra note 45, at 112. This negotiation, or no immediate rush to
encashment, was possible because merchants had faith that the bill would be paid when presented.
See id. For a comprehensive account of the history of bills of exchange in England, see J. MILNES
HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAW 4-65 (1955).
50. See HOLDEN, supra note 49, at 70-73. When gold was frequently used as money, people
would often deposit their gold with goldsmiths for fear of loss or theft. See Eggert, supra note 45,
at 386 (citing HOLDEN, supra note 49, at 72). On receiving the deposit, the goldsmith would issue
notes in the amount of gold deposited. Id. If a depositor wanted to pay a seller, the depositor would
offer a goldsmith's note. See HOLDEN, supra note 49, at 70-73. The seller would accept this
method of payment if the seller trusted the goldsmith. See Boris Kozolchyk, Tran sfrr ofPersonal
Property by a Nonowner: Its Failure in Light q/ Its Past, 61 Tt L. L. REV. 1453, 1493 (1987). The
goldsmith's note may be understood as a "promise by the goldsmith" to pay in gold when the seller
presented the note for encashment. See id. at 1492. If the goldsmith enjoyed a good reputation in
the community, his notes would circulate as money substitutes. HOLDEN, supra note 49. Again,
this negotiation was possible because the people in the community had faith that the goldsmith
would pay the note upon presentment. Kozolchyk, supra. An ordinary promissory note is not much
different from the goldsmith's note. Just like the goldsmith's note, a promissory note is also a
"promise to pay a certain sum," often at a future date. Eggert, supra note 45, at 374. The difference
lies in the fact that the maker of a promissory note is most likely an ordinary person, not a
goldsmith, borrowing money and promising to pay at a future date, with or without interest. That is
why promissory notes were known as "bills of debt." JAMES WEBSTER EATON & FRANK B.
GILBERT, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL PAPER AND THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 19
(1903) (citing GERARD MALYNES, CONSUETUDO, VEL LEX MERCATORIA OR THE ANCIENT LAW-
MERCHANT 71-72 (London, Adam Islip 1622)). Promissory notes containing high interest rates
were embodiments of usury. See ROGERS, supra note 45, at 70. Some systems, therefore, were
initially reluctant to enforce excessive interest promissory notes. TEOPiiIUS PARSONS, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES AND BILLS OF EXCHANGE 400-01 (1873); see
ROGERS, supra note 45, at 70-71. In England, even the negotiation of a promissory note was
initially beyond the protection of the law. JOHN BARNARD BYLES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY NOTES, BANK-NOTES AND CHEQU ES 7 (1899); see also
Eggert, supra note 45, at 387 ("[T]he transferability of promissory notes through indorsement was
not originally recognized at the common law.").
51. Khan, supra note 2, at 433. The goldsmith's note was the early ancestor of the modern
check. HOLDEN, supra note 49, at 70-73. The rise of banks was the natural evolution of
goldsmiths. Id. The bank, in the modern sense, accepts deposits and allows account holders to
write checks. Not too long ago, however, even banks issued notes that freely circulated as money
substitutes-a medium of exchange-among traders and ordinary people. See Kahn, supra note 2,
at 430. Gradually, checking accounts replaced bank notes. See id. at 433. In fact, the modern check
is a functional hybrid of a bank note and a bill of exchange. Just like a bill of exchange, a check is
also a three-party instrument. Kenneth D. Ferguson, Does Payment by Check Constitute a Tran sftr
upon Delivery or Payment?, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 97 (1990). Yet, there is a difference between
the two: A bill of exchange or a draft may or may not be drawn on a bank, whereas a check is
always drawn on a bank. See U.C.C. § 3-104(e), (f); Khan, supra note 2, at 433. A check is not a
note because the drawee bank does not promise to pay every check drawn on its deposits. U.C.C.
§ 3-408. The drawee bank pays only if there are sufficient funds in the account on which the check
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Article focuses predominantly on drafts since notes are essentially debt rather
than payment instruments. 5 2 As a general principle, no negotiable instrument
can come into lawful existence without authorization. Although the issuer is the
first person that authorizes the instrument and launches it into the stream of
commerce, the authorization principle is not confined to the issuer's liability.
The principle is a dynamic normative force that governs all operations
performed on the instrument, including transfer, accommodation, acceptance,
and accord and satisfaction. 53 When the original payee transfers the instrument
to another person, the oriinal payee authorizes the new payee to be the lawful
owner of the instrument.i 4 This transfer imposes liability on the original payee
to pay to the subsequent payee if the instrument is dishonored. 55 Likewise, if a
payor bank accepts to pay an instrument, the acceptance imposes payment
liability on the payor bank. 56 Each operation performed on the instrument
requires authorization. And as a general rule, each authorized operation imposes
liability on the operator.
5 7
1. Classical Authorization
The NIL recognizes several ways to authorize a negotiable instrument.
58
Because negotiable instruments are frequently written on paper, they are
tangible entities that can be possessed, transferred, and presented for payment.
59
Signing the instrument is the classic and the most convenient method of
authorization. 60 The issuer's signature on the paper instrument authorizes its
is drawn. See Khan, supra note 2, at 434. In contrast, a bank note is a solid promise to pay. Id. at
410-13, 434. Today, a cashier's check is more akin to a bank note. See U.C.C. §§ 3-104(g), 3-412.
52. However, the discussion of notes is not excluded since these instruments are also
governed by the authorization principle.
53. See U.C.C. §§ 3-201(b), 3-31 l(a), 3-413(a), 3-419(a).
54. U.C.C. § 3-203(b).
55. U.C.C. § 3-415.
56. U.C.C. § 3-413(a).
57. This concept appears to have been accepted for ages. A law review article published in
1893 suggests that an authorized alteration is binding on the drawer. Melville M. Bigelow,
Alteration of Negotiable Instruments, 7 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1893). In the nineteenth century,
consent seems to be the key word in capturing the concept of authorization. See id.
58. See U.C.C. §§ 3-401 to 3-402.
59. The concept of delivery and possession are critical to the issuance and negotiation of
instruments; these concepts presuppose the tangibility of instruments. Though paper is not
officially required, it is the most convenient tangible medium in which the instrument can be
delivered, possessed, and exhibited. See U.C.C. §§ 3-105(a), 3-201(a), 3-501(b)(2)(i). However,
electronic presentment is authorized. U.C.C. § 3-501 cmt.
60. See U.C.C. § 3-401 cmt. 1.
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payment. 61 More specifically, the maker's signature on a note binds the maker
to pay the stated amount, whereas the drawer's signature on a draft is required
in order for the drawee to pay the amount stated on the instrument. The
drawer's signature does not obligate the drawee to pay the draft, 63 but the
drawer's signature does obligate the drawer to pay the draft in case the drawee
dishonors the draft.64 Regardless of whether the paper instrument is a note or a
draft, a signature means authorization, which imposes payment liability on the
signer.
The signature, central to the definition of negotiable instruments, is
indispensable. An instrument must have a signature. 66 The NIL requires seven
elements, including the issuer's signature, for the lawful construction of a
negotiable instrument. 67 Many of the seven elements, if missing from the
61. For an interesting case regarding signature, see La Mar Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Credit &
Commodity Corp., 216 N.Y.S.2d 186, 190 (City Ct. 1961) ("The signature on the telegram in suit,
although typed in the office of the telegraph company, is therefore defendant's authorized
signature .... ).
62. Gerald T. McLaughlin, On the Periphery of Letter-of1 Credit Law: Softening the Rigors
of'Strict Compliance, 106 BANKING L.J. 4, 17 (1989) (citing U.C.C. § 3-401(1)(a) (1987)). The
draft is a three-party instrument. James E. Byrne, Negotiation in Letter of'Credit Practice and Law:
The Evolution of'the Doctrine, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 561, 563 n.1 (2007). A draft drawn on a bank is
called a check. U.C.C. § 3-104(t). Courts made this clear in the nineteenth century. See Francis R.
Jones, The Liability of the Maker of'a Check After Certification, 6 HARV. L. REV. 138, 139 (1892).
63. U.C.C. § 3-408.
64. The drawer's liability is triggered when the drawee dishonors the draft. See U.C.C. § 3-
414(b).
65. U.C.C. § 3-403(a). Even an authorized signer is personally liable. See Jane Kaufman
Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of 'Internet Commerce, 72 TIL. L. REV. 1177,
1222-23 (1998) (explaining the nuances of a signature on negotiable instruments).
66. Article 3 defines an instrument as a promise or an order. See U.C.C. § 3-104(b), (e).
Both an order and promise are signed writings. See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(8), (12).
67. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a) & cmt. 1. A negotiable instrument-either a note or a draft-
must be (1) in writing, (2) signed, (3) an unconditional promise or order to pay (4) a fixed sum (5)
on demand or at a definite time, (6) either to bearer or to the order of a named payee, and (7)
containing no extra undertaking. See id. These elements constitute the negotiability of the
instrument. They legally empower the instrument to be negotiable. One purpose of negotiability is
to free the instrument from the claims and defenses arising from the underlying transaction that
occasioned the issuance of the instrument. See U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 1. In contrast to negotiability,
negotiation is the mode of transfer from one holder to the next. Benjamin Geva, Forged Check
Indorsement Losses Under the UCC. The Role of Policy in the Emergence of Law Merchant.from
Common Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1733, 1737 n. 13 (2000). The law recognizes two main methods
of negotiation: one by delivery alone, see Tex. Sw. Med. Supply, Inc. v. Tex. Commerce Bank-
Dallas, N.A., No. 05-93-00001-CV, 1994 WL 246169, at *4 (Tex. App. June 2, 1994), and the
other by "indorsement and delivery," Yeskolski v. Crosby, 480 S.E.2d 474, 476 (Va. 1997)
(quoting Becker v. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 284 S.E.2d 793, 795 (Va. 1981)). Bearer instruments
with no named payees are negotiated by delivery alone. Tex. Sw., 1994 WL 246169, at *4; U.C.C.
§ 3-201(b). Order instruments, where the payee is named on the instrument, are negotiated by the
named payee's indorsement and delivery. Becker, 284 S.E.2d at 795; U.C.C. § 3-201(b).
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instrument, are supplied through default rules. For example, if the instrument
contains no time of payment, the default rule makes the instrument payable on
demand. 9 No default rule, however, supplies a missing signature. If the issuer's
signature is missing, the instrument does not exist as a lawful liability. 70 The
strict requirement that the issuer or the representative of the issuer place the
signature on the face of the instrument validates the principle of authorization.
Note, however, that the NIL does not require a manual signature on every
instrument and furnishes ample flexibility with respect to what constitutes a
signature.
71
A signature, although a constitutive element of the instrument, is not the
only method to authorize an instrument.72 The authorization may not be
apparent from the face of the instrument.73 It may be contained in a separate
agreement or may be located in the nature and purpose of a relationship, such as
an agency relationship. 74 A principal may authorize an agent to sign an
instrument.75 The authorization principle holds the principal liable on the
instrument although the principal has not signed the instrument. 76 Some
principals or represented persons, such as corporations and governments, cannot
sign instruments and must rely on human representatives to execute the
formality of a signature. 77 In all such cases, the authorization principle imposes
liability on the represented person even if the instrument does not mention the
represented person.78 However, if the representative fails to mention the
represented person and the representation on the face of the instrument, then the
68. U.C.C. §§ 3-108(a)-(b), 3-109(a)(2)-(3), 3-111.
69. U.C.C. § 3-108(a).
70. Juliet M. Moringiello, Revised Article 9, Liens .fom the Fringe, and Why Sometimes
Signatures Don't Matter, 10 WIDENER J. PIB. L. 135, 151 (2001) (citing U.C.C. § 3-401 cmt. I
(1990)).
71. U.C.C. § 3-401(b). The concept of electronic signature, although not applicable to
paper-based negotiable instruments, is innovative in that it could mean "an electronic sound,
symbol, or process" associated with a record. Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7006(5).
72. Linda J. Rusch, Reimagining Payment Systems: Allocation of Risk .br Unauthorized
Payment Inception, 83 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 561, 571-72 (2008) (citing U.C.C. §§ 3-401(a), 4-401
cmt. 1 (2002)) (explaining that even unsigned checks may be authorized).
73. For example, the represented person, such as the principal, may not be identified on the
face of the instrument. Yet the represented person is liable. See U.C.C. § 3-402 cmt. 1.
74. Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of1 Internet
Commerce, 72 Tt L. L. REV. 1217-18 (1998).
75. Id.
76. U.C.C. § 3-402(a).
77. Corporations and governments are juridical entities and distinguishable from natural
persons. See United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S. 795, 804 (1948). Both corporations
and natural persons can act through representatives. However, juridical entities cannot sign
instruments because, as juridical entities, they can act only through human agency. See id.
78. U.C.C. § 3-402(a).
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representative, by signing the instrument, is personally liable to pay the
instrument to a person who takes or pays the instrument in good faith and for
value. 79 If a representative is forced to pay the instrument to a lawful payee, the
authorization principle empowers the representative to demand full
reimbursement from the represented person.80
The authorization principle allows subsequent ratification of an
unauthorized or a forged signature. 81 Generally, a forged signature is void ab
initio, and the UCC imposes no obligation on the person whose signature is
82forged. The authorization principle can remedy this fatal flaw in the legality of
an instrument. By owning the forged signature, the issuer whose signature was
forged authorizes the instrument. 3 The forged signature itself is not corrected
on the instrument.84 Nor does the issuer imprint a new signature on the
instrument. The authorization principle simply effaces the legal ineffectiveness
of the forged signature. 8 Likewise, an issuer may authorize another person to
sign the issuer's name.86 This signature may vary dramatically from the issuer's
customary signature. However, the critical issue is not the incongruity between
the two signatures, which might be obvious and must be conceded. The critical
issue focuses on the question of whether the issuer authorized the signer to sign
the issuer's name.87 If the issuer's authorization is proved, the accuracy of the
79. U.C.C. § 3-402(b)(2).
80. Id.
81. U.C.C. § 3-403(a).
82. See, e.g., id. (providing that a signature is "ineffective" except in limited circumstances).
The rule of subsequent ratification applies to any party whose signature on the instrument is
forged. See id. Indorsers, anomalous indorsers, acceptors, accommodation parties, drawees, and
makers may all invoke the authorization principle to subsequently ratify a fraudulent or
unauthorized signature. See id. ("An unauthorized signature may be ratified for all purposes of this
Article.").
83. See U.C.C. § 3-403 cmt. 3; U.C.C. § 1-201(41) (2001). Signature includes indorsement.
See U.C.C. § 3-401 cmt. 1 (2002). Therefore, even a forged instrument can be ratified.
84. The signer, however, remains criminally liable for ratification because a forged
signature does not affect the rights of the state to enforce criminal law. See U.C.C. § 3-403(c) &
cmt. 3.
85. See U.C.C. § 3-403 cmt. 3; U.C.C. § 1-201(41) (2001).
86. U.C.C. § 3-402(a) (2002).
87. See, e.g., Carelli v. Hall, 926 P.2d 756, 762 (Mont. 1996) ("Conversely, where an
authorized representative signs his own name to an instrument, the representative-rather than the
represented person-is personally obligated unless the instrument either names the person
represented or shows that the representative signed in a representative capacity." (citing MONT.
CODE ANN. § 30-3-403(2)(a) (1985))). The same analysis applies to the signature of any other
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issuer's signature is irrelevant for the purpose of the issuer's liability to pay the
instrument.
88
2. Prior and Subsequent Liabilities
As noted previously, the authorization principle is not confined to the
issuance of instruments. 89 The principle applies with equal force to other legal
operations performed on the instrument, including negotiation, accommodation,
acceptance, and accord and satisfaction. 90  When an instrument is
accommodated, for example, no accommodation without authorization is
valid.91 The capacity in which the instrument is accommodated constitutes an
essential part of authorization. 92 An accommodation party may authorize
accommodation as a primary obligation, in which case the accommodation
party signs the instrument as a maker. 93 Accommodation may also be authorized
as a secondary obligation, in which case the accommodation party signs the
instrument as an anomalous indorser.94 Consistent with the authorization
principle, accommodation may be authorized to guarantee collection rather than
payment. 95 The authorization principle rationalizes these various capacities of
accommodation with varying degrees of liability because no person should be
held liable beyond the scope of that person's authorization.
96
88. Indeed, the issuer might not even be disclosed. In that case, however, the signer must be
the representative of the undisclosed represented person. U.C.C. § 3-402(a). A taker of the
instrument may not know the issuer's exact signature but may know the issuer's name. Any
discrepancy between the name and the signature makes the instrument facially irregular, a
circumstance under which the taker may be denied the status of a holder in due course. See U.C.C.
§§ 3-302(a)(1), 3-305(a)(1). However, even if the signer signs a name other than the issuer's name,
the issuer is still liable under the authorization principle. Carelli, 926 P.2d at 762 (citing MONT.
CODE ANN. § 30-3-403(2)(a)).
89. See supra text accompanying note 53.
90. U.C.C. §§ 3-201(b), 3-311 (a), 3-413(a), 3-419(a).
91. U.C.C. §3-419(a). An accommodation party must sign the instrument. Id. The
accommodation party may sign in the capacity of maker, drawer, accepter, or indorser. U.C.C. § 3-
419(b). However, signature is needed to incur liability. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Even though accommodation is associated with promissory notes, the concept allows
for the accommodation of drafts and even checks. See 7 AM. JL R. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Status as
Accomodation Party § 1 (1975) (citing U.C.C. § 3-415(1) (1957); 11 AM. JU R. 2D Bills and Notes
§ 8 (1975)).
94. U.C.C. §§ 3-205(d), 3-419(c). Anomalous indorsement is the signature of a person who
is not the holder of the instrument. U.C.C. § 3-205(d).
95. U.C.C. § 3-419(d).
96. See U.C.C. § 3-419(b).
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A new liability incurred on an instrument may not discharge a prior
liability.97 For example, when the original payee indorses a draft and thus
authorizes its delivery to the new payee, the original payee incurs the indorser's
liability. The indorser's liability is thus added to the instrument without
subtracting the drawer's liability. The two liabilities coexist on the same
instrument, although in a hierarchical order: The draft's lawful payee must first
present the draft to the drawee for payment. 99 The indorser's liability, although
existent, lays dormant until the drawer and the drawee both dishonor the
draft. Upon dishonor, the indorser's liability may be activated with groper
notice.' ° Likewise, the drawer's liability is also activated upon dishonor. The
two activated liabilities allow the lawful payee to enforce the instrument against
either obligor.' 
03
Not every new liability is an additional liability; a new liability ma
discharge prior liabilities. If a payor bank authorizes the acceptance of a draft,
the acceptance creates the bank's liability on the instrument. 105 However, this
new liability added to the instrument discharges the drawer's liability. 06 In this
case, the two liabilities cannot coexist on the same instrument. If there are any
indorsements on the draft, the bank's acceptance discharges every indorser's
liability contracted on the draft. 107 Thus, acceptance of a draft dissolves prior
liabilities and substitutes many liabilities for one.' Likewise, when a maker
pays a note, all obligations on the note are discharged. 1°9 If the maker tenders
payment on the note but the payee refuses, all obligations except that of the
maker are discharged to the extent of the amount of the tender. 110
97. However, when a drawee accepts a draft, the drawer is discharged. U.C.C. § 3-414(c).
The liability of the indorser is also discharged. U.C.C. § 3-415(d).
98. U.C.C. § 3-415(a).
99. Barry L. Zaretsky, Contract Liability of'Parties to Negotiable Instruments, 42 ALA. L.
REV. 627, 635 (1991). A drawee is not liable on an unaccepted draft. U.C.C. § 3-408.
100. See U.C.C. § 3-415(a).
101. U.C.C. § 3-503(a).
102. U.C.C. § 3-414(b).
103. U.C.C. §§ 3-414 to 3-415. The drawer must pay the indorser who paid the draft.
U.C.C. § 3-414(b).
104. U.C.C. § 3-409(a).
105. U.C.C. § 3-413(a).
106. U.C.C. § 3-414(c).
107. U.C.C. § 3-415(d).
108. See id.
109. See U.C.C. §§ 3-415(d), 3-603(c). However, an accommodation party that pays the
instrument retains the right of reimbursement from the accommodated party. U.C.C. § 3-419(t).
110. U.C.C. § 3-603(b).
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3. Properly Payable Doctrine
The properly payable doctrine reinforces the authorization principle. Article
4 of the Uniform Commercial Code presents the properly payable doctrine to
define the relationship between the payor bank and its account holder.", The
doctrine states simply that an authorized payment is properly payable.' 12 The
accountholder's authorization is evidenced by means of a check, a draft, or a
note payable through the payor bank.1 13 In authorizing a payment, the account
holder orders the payor bank to pay a specific amount either to the bearer or to
the order of a named payee. If the amount of an authorized payment is altered,
or if the payment is made to a wrongful payee, the properly payable doctrine is
breached.11 4 Consequently, the payor bank cannot lawfully charge the account
holder for any unauthorized payment. 5
The properly payable doctrine clarifies that both the amount of payment
and the rightful payee are the essential attributes of an authorized payment. 116
111. U.C.C. § 4-401(a). In the terminology of Article 3, the payor bank is the drawee bank,
and the customer is the drawer. Rusch, supra note 72, at 563 n.10 (citing U.C.C. §§ 4-104(a)(5), 4-
105(3) (2002)). Whereas Article 3 uses the concept of "instrument," see U.C.C. § 3-104 (2002),
Article 4 uses the concept of "item," see U.C.C. § 4-108 (2002). Item, defined in Article 4, is a
broader term than instrument in Article 3, and includes negotiable instruments. See U.C.C. § 4-
104(9). Under Article 4, account holder means customer. See U.C.C. § 4-104(5).
112. U.C.C. § 4-401(a). To understand the authorization principle and the concomitant bank
liability, payor banks must be distinguished from depositary banks. The item in issue is what
defines the status of a bank. The bank where the item in issue is deposited is the depositary bank,
and the bank that pays the item is the payor bank. See U.C.C. § 4-105(2)-(3). Payor banks, also
known as drawees or drawee banks, have the duty to pay instruments as authorized by their
account holders, also known as drawers. See Lawrence Kalevitch, Luck o the Drawee: The
Finality of'Bank Payments to Holders in Due Course, 105 BANKINGL.J. 416,425 n.21 (1988). The
relationship between the account holder and the payor bank is contractual, established at the time
of opening the checking account. A. Brooke Overby, Check Fraud in the Courts After the
Revisions to U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4, 57 ALA. L. REV. 351, 362 (2005). Although the contractual
relationship between the bank and the account holder may vary the provisions of Article 4, the
parties cannot contract away the bank's mandatory responsibility to process and pay instruments
both in good faith and with care. U.C.C. § 4-103(a).
113. See U.C.C. § 4-106(a)-(b). These subsections distinguish items "payable through" a
bank from items "payable at" a bank. Id.
114. U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 1.
115. Id. However, payor banks may vary their strict liability under the properly payable
doctrine by means of a contract with the account holder. U.C.C. §§ 4-103(a), 4-401(a). Many
banks contract out of strict liability. See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 374 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing U.C.C. §§ 4-103(a), 4-401(a) (2002))
(recognizing defendant bank's right to contract out of strict liability).
116. U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 1; Subcomm. on Payments, Am. Bar Ass'n, Deterring Check
Fraud: The Model Positive Pay Services Agreement and Commentary, 54 BuS. LAW. 637, 674
(1999). However, an authorized payment for more than the amount available in the customer's
account is properly payable. U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 1.
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The signature is a method of authorization, but what is being authorized is the
payment of a specific amount of money to the bearer or to the order of the
named payee. The authorization principle, therefore, is sensitive not only to the
proper method of authorization but also to the contents of authorization-the
amount and the payee." 7 The principle is violated when the account holder's
signature is forged, the amount is altered, or the payment is made to a wrongful
payee. The payment made to a wrongful payee would frequently involve a
forged or missing indorsement of the rightful payee." 8
a. Beyond Technical Ruses
The authorization principle is no technical ruse opposed to equity and
fairness. Nor is the principle applied mechanically to recredit the account
holder's account every time a payment is made over a forged or missing
indorsement. Firmly anchored in equity, the authorization principle may
overlook forged and missing indorsements to inquire whether the payment is
made to the intended payee." 9 If a person whom the drawer intended to pay
receives an instrument that evidences payment and "the drawer suffered no• ,, 120
damages caused by the improper payment, the account holder cannot rely on
intervening forged or missing indorsements to demand that the payor bank
recredit the account holder's account. 121 No court would allow any such fact-
blind interpretation of the properly payable doctrine because it would result in
the drawer's unjust enrichment-a consequence that equity cannot sanction.122
If the intended payee receives payment, the payment system is not compromised
and no party suffers any injury.
117. Id. An item containing a forged indorsement is not properly payable. Id.
118. See, e.g., Ambassador Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ind. Nat'l Bank, 591 N.E.2d 1061, 1064 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1992) (noting that a forged or missing indorsement renders the instrument not properly
payable).
119. See, e.g., Bank One, Columbus, N.A. v. Hochstadt, 515 So. 2d 332, 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (entering summary judgment for the bank where the payee-as intended by the
drawer-received proceeds of check paid over a missing indorsement).
120. Ambassador Fin. Servs., Inc., 605 N.E.2d at 752.
121. Id.
122. Id.; Comerica Bank v. Mich. Nat'l Bank, 536 N.W.2d 298, 300 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
123. Bankers Trust of S.C. v. S.C. Nat'l Bank of Charleston, 284 S.C. 238, 244, 325 S.E.2d
81, 85 (Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Atil. Bank of N.Y. v. Israel Disc. Bank Ltd., 441 N.Y.S.2d 315,
317-18 (App. Term 1981)). The South Carolina Court of Appeals offered a systemic explanation
of the intended payee doctrine:
Where the proceeds of a forged check reach the intended payee, there can as a
general rule be no cause of action by anyone on the forged endorsement. The payee
cannot sue ... since he has suffered no damage-he has, after all, received the monies
intended for him. The drawer [Bankers Trust] may not sue the drawee-payor bank
[Bankers Trust] for an improper charge on his account because, again, no damage has
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The authorization principle encounters anomalies when thieves possess
bearer instruments. According to the NIL, any person in possession of a bearer
instrument is a holder. 124 Thus, a person who finds or steals a bearer instrument
is a holder. 125 To make matters worse, Article 3 introduces the concept of the
"person entitled to enforce" (PETE) the instrument and provides that every
holder of an instrument is a PETE.12 6 Even a non-holder who has the rights of a
holder is a PETE. 12 7 The concept of the PETE is useful to the extent that it
authorizes payment to a person who enjoys the rights of a holder but who, for a
variety of reasons, cannot obtain the technical status of a holder.128 For instance,
a person who inherits an unindorsed instrument from a deceased payee is a
PETE, even if the deceased payee died without indorsing the instrument.
1 29
Since a person must possess the instrument in order to assert the rights of a
holder, the concept of PETE also covers situations where the payee has lost
possession of the instrument but continues to be the rightful payee., Such a
rightful payee, though no longer a holder, is a PETE.'
3'
Although the concept of the PETE clarifies lawful payments to certain
rightful payees, it generates an anomaly in the case of thieves-persons who
steal and possess bearer instruments. According to the UCC, every holder is a
PETE.132 This means that a thief in possession of a bearer instrument is the
person entitled to enforce the instrument.' 33 That a thief is "entitled" to enforce
been suffered as the funds have been put to their proper use.... Being immune from
suit once the payee has received his funds, the payor bank has suffered no damage from
the forgery and hence cannot reap undeserved benefits from the collecting bank.
Id.
124. U.C.C. § 1-201(21) (2001).
125. Overby, supra note 112, at 364 n.83 (citing U.C.C. § 3-201 cmt. 1 (2002)).
126. U.C.C. § 3-301 (2002).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Timothy R. Zinnecker, Extending Enfbrcement Rights to Assignees of Lost,
Destroyed, or Stolen Negotiable Instruments Under the U.C.C. Article 3: A Proposal/br Refbrm,
50 U. KAN. L. REV. 111, 113 (2001) ("Section 3-301 defines a 'person entitled to enforce' as '(i)
the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a
holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the
instrument pursuant to Section 3-309 or 3-418(d)."' (quoting U.C.C. § 3-301 (1990))).
129. U.C.C. § 3-301. This is a person who is a nonholder but has the rights of a holder
under the laws of inheritance.
130. Zinnecker, supra note 128, at 118 (citing U.C.C. § 3-301(iii) (1990)).
131. Id.
132. U.C.C. § 3-301.
133. See id.; Timothy R. Zinnecker, A Literalist Proposes Four Modest Revisions to U.C.C.
Article 3, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 63, 76 n.71 (1998). However, a holder-thief taking an instrument is
subject to the property rights in the instrument. U.C.C. § 3-306.
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a bearer instrument that he stole is an obvious abuse of the term
"entitlement."' 134 It is unlikely that a court will allow a thief to first steal a bearer
instrument and then blatantly argue that the thief is entitled to enforce the
instrument, forcing the obligor as a matter of law to pay the instrument.' 35 The
court's decision not to enforce a bearer instrument in the thief's hand would be
consistent with the authorization principle because no maker of the note or
drawer of the draft has authorized that a bearer instrument can be paid to a
thief.136 Likewise, the depositary bank may refuse to collect a bearer instrument,
and the payor bank may dishonor payment if either bank has reason to believe
that the holder of the bearer instrument is in wrongful possession. 37 The payor
bank may refuse to pay if the thief, though holder of the bearer instrument,
presents the check for over-the-counter payment.' This refusal will be
consistent with the authorization principle and also litigation-proof because no
thief would dare go to the court to claim the rights of a PETE.
A thief, although not entitled to enforce the bearer instrument as a matter of
right, may nonetheless succeed in obtaining payment. If the payor bank in good
faith pays a bearer instrument to a thief, the drawer is liable on the instrument,
and the payor bank may lawfully charge the account holder's account on which
the bearer instrument is drawn. 3 9 The account holder cannot rely on the
134. See U.C.C. § 3-301.
135. See, e.g., State v. Barrick, 46 P.3d 770, 772-73 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (citing UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6-501(1)(b) (1997)) (holding that an unauthorized completion of a bearer
negotiable instrument by a finder or thief is a criminal act).
136. The courts often distinguish between ownership of and entitlement to an instrument.
Perrino v. Salem, Inc., 243 B.R. 550, 559 (D. Me. 1999) (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3-
1203 cmt. 1 (1999)); Util. Conservation Servs. v. Elec. & Gas Indus. Ass'n, No. C051047, 2007
WL 1041678, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. April 9, 2007) (quoting U.C.C. § 3-203 cmt. 1 (2002)). A thief
of a bearer paper may be a PETE, but the thief cannot be the owner of a stolen instrument. Perrino,
243 B.R. at 559 (citing tit. 11, § 3-203 cmt. 1 (2002)); Util. Conservation Servs., 2007 WL
1041678, at *7 (quoting U.C.C. § 3-203 cmt. 1 (2002)). However, if the thief negotiates the bearer
instrument to a holder in due course, the instrument is properly payable. The drawer cannot assert
any real defense available under UCC section 3-305 because none is available. One might also
argue that by issuing a bearer instrument, the issuer undertakes a risk that the instrument would be
in good faith paid to a holder who has stolen the instrument.
137. If a depository bank takes the instrument in good faith for value, without knowing that
the customer has stolen the instrument, the bank is a holder in due course. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 4-
205(1).
138. A payor bank is not immune to the good faith obligation in making payments. For
example, a payor bank may charge a customer's account according to the original terms of an
altered check provided the bank makes the payment in good faith. U.C.C. § 4-401(d). It may
therefore be argued that a payment knowingly made to a thief is incompatible with a good faith
payment. If the payor bank dishonors a properly payable instrument, the bank runs the risk of
wrongful dishonor. U.C.C. § 4-402.
139. Chung v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 714 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (Dist. Ct. 2000). The court
concluded that "[t]he problem with imposing an identity or ownership check requirement on the
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authorization principle to demand that the payor bank recredit the account
holder's account. The most articulate expression of this rule may be found in a
case that the Air Force Review Board decided in 1961.140
The Board drew a comparison between stolen goods and stolen instruments:
"[A] thief cannot pass good title to a chattel even to an innocent purchaser.
However, a long recognized exception to this rule concerns money and
commercial paper genuine on its face."' 14 1 Commercial necessity validates the
exception and places a burden of good faith, and not one of diligence, on the
purchaser of a stolen instrument. 142 In validating the exception, however, the
Board verbalized the rule more broadly than current law warrants. The Board
concluded that "the transfer of stolen negotiable paper to a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice and before maturity vests in him good title against all
the world, including the true owner."' 143 The Board's ruling failed to distinguish
between bearer instruments and specified-payee instruments.' The ruling is
correct with respect to bearer instruments but incorrect with respect to
instruments payable to the order of specified payee.
A stolen negotiable instrument, payable to the order of a specified payee,
does not transfer good title to the thief or to a subsequent transferee. 4 5 If the
thief forges the specified payee's indorsement, the instrument is not properly
payable. With respect to checks, the account holder may ask the payor bank
to recredit the account holder's account for paying the instrument to the
wrongful payee. 147 The payor bank would invoke presentment warranties to
demand recredit from the banks that collected the instrument with the forged
negotiation of bearer paper is that such a requirement would impede the free negotiability which is
the essence of bearer paper." Id.
140. United States v. Jackson, 31 C.M.R. 673, 677 (A.F.B.R. 1961), rev'd, 32 C.M.R. 66
(C.M.A. 1962).
141. Id. (citing United States v. Gaines, 9 C.M.R. 854, 856 (A.F.B.R. 1953)).
142. Id. (citing 8 AM. JUR. Bills and Notes § 619 (1937); 10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes § 507
(1937)).
143. Id. The instrument in this case was a bearer instrument at the time of issuance. Id. at
678. The thief, however, added his name to the instrument and then indorsed it. Id. The Board
argued that the stolen instrument was indeed a bearer instrument, id., and an innocent purchaser
acquired lawful title to the instrument, id. at 679.
144. Id. at 677. The Board did not raise the question whether the thief could pass the title if
the thief forged the indorsement of the rightful payee.
145. See Marion W. Benfield, Jr. & Peter A. Alces, Reinventing the Wheel, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1405, 1435 n.117 (1994).
146. Subcomm. on Payments, Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 116.
147. Willier, Inc. v. Hurt, No. 5:06-cv-00547, 2007 WL 4613033, at *8 (S.D. W. Va. Dec.
31, 2007) ("A customer is not liable for the amount of an overdraft if the customer neither signed
the item nor benefited from the proceeds of the item."); see also U.C.C. § 4-401(b) (2002).
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indorsement. 14  The loss may eventually fall on the depositary bank that
received the instrument from the thief 149 because the thief is unlikely to
reimburse the depositary bank. 150 The law defends this allocation of loss on the
theory that the one who deals with the wrongdoer, the thief in this case, must
suffer the loss.' 5 1 Intriguingly, though, the Board's ruling is consistent with the
international law of negotiable instruments. 152
B. Electronic Payments
The authorization principle applies to credit cards and electronic fund
transfers (electronic payments) as well. 153 In the early period of credit cards,
148. U.C.C. § 4-208(b); see Overby, supra note 112, at 362. A person presenting the check
warrants that he is entitled to enforce. U.C.C. § 4-208(a)(1).
149. See J.A.C. Hetherington, Trends in Enterprise Liability: Law and the Unauthorized
Agent, 19 STAN. L. REV. 76, 123-24 (1966).
150. U.C.C. § 4-207(b). The thief breached the transfer warranty, claiming that the thief was
a person entitled to enforce the instrument. See id. § 4-207(a)(1). The depository bank has an
actionable claim against the thief for breach of warranty. Id. § 4-207(c). However, if the thief is
insolvent or unavailable, the depository bank is stuck with the loss. From a policy viewpoint, this
loss allocation is fair since the person who deals with the wrongdoer should suffer the loss-a
concept embodied in the maxim "know your [i]ndorser." Gerold Herrmann, Background and
Salient Features of the United Nations Convention on International Bills o1' Exchange and
International Promissory Notes, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L BuS. L. 517, 528 (1988).
151. Again, this refers to the maxim, "Know your [i]ndorser." Herrmann, supra note 150, at
528; Hetherington, supra note 149, at 123 n.190.
152. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes defines a holder
differently than does common law or Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See United
Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, G.A.
Res. 43/165, art. 5(f), U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/165 (Dec. 9, 1988) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 43/165],
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r165.htm. Under common law, a forged
indorsement on an instrument disrupts the chain of good title, and no person in possession of the
instrument subsequent to a forged indorsement is a holder. Banking Briefs: Collecting Bank Is
Liable to Payor Bank/lbr Presentment of Checks with Forged Indorsements, 115 BANKING L.J.
990 (1998). Under the UNCITRAL Convention, however, a person in possession of an instrument
is a holder "even if any endorsement was forged or was signed by an agent without authority."
G.A. Res. 43/165, supra, at art. 15(l)(b). Notwithstanding the forged indorsement, the holder who
took the instrument in good faith and for value would be entitled to payment under the
UNCITRAL Convention.
153. Federal law, codified as the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA), 15 U.S.C
§§ 1601-1693r (2006), regulates credit cards and electronic fund transfers. Subchapter I of the
CCPA, known as the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), governs credit cards, id. §§ 1601-1667(t),
whereas subchapter VI of the CCPA, known as the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA),
regulates ATM or debit cards and other electronic devices used to authorize a financial institution
to debit or credit an account, id. §§ 1693-1693r. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Board) has the authority to issue regulations to clarify, supplement, and carry out the
purposes of these statutes. Id. § 1604(a). Accordingly, the Board has promulgated Regulation Z to
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which originated under the law of contracts, the authorization principle was
rarely accepted as the governing norm.' 54 Under most contracts, the cardholder
was liable for unauthorized purchases prior to surrendering the card to the
issuer. 155 This oppressive contract rule later evolved into another contract
provision that held the cardholder liable for unauthorized uses of the card prior
to giving notice to the issuer that the card was lost or stolen.' 56 Even the
liability-until-notice rule was incompatible with the authorization principle
because the rule held the cardholder liable for unauthorized charges before
notice of lost or stolen card was given, avoiding the temporality question of
when the cardholder knew that the card had been lost or stolen.'
5 7
The federal regulation of credit cards introduced the authorization principle,
which overrode the liability-until-surrender and liability-until-notice provisions
of contract law. Accordingly, a cardholder 1  is liable for payments that the
cardholder authorizes. Conversely, a cardholder is not liable for payments that
the cardholder does not authorize, including the charges made on lost or stolen
cards. 159 Therefore, both versions of the authorization principle-authorization
imposes liability and no authorization, no liability-regulate electronic
payments.
Note, however, that the credit card is both a payment device and a debt
instrument because it combines the functions of payment and borrowing. As a
payment device, the credit card serves as a money substitute for the purchase of
enforce TTLA, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b) (2008), and Regulation E to enforce EFTA, id. § 205.1(b). To
further clarify the regulations, the Board issues documents called Official Staff Interpretations,
which carry considerable weight unless shown to be demonstrably irrational. See Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565-67 (1980).
154. See, e.g., James Steven Rogers, The Basic Principle o" Loss Allocation .fbr
Unauthorized Checks, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 453, 468-69 (2004) (documenting cases that did
not fully accept the authorization principle).
155. Magnolia Petrol. Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d 881, 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). In the
1940s, the cardholder was responsible for all purchases made by the use of the card prior to the
surrender of the card to the issuer. Id.
156. Credit Cards: Distributing Fraud Loss, 77 YALE L.J. 1418, 1420 (1968).
157. See, e.g., Allied Stores of N.Y., Inc. v. Funderburke, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8, 11-12 (Civ. Ct.
1967) (holding that the cardholder is not liable without knowing the loss or theft of card).
158. Both the TILA and the EFTA define the term "card" broadly. Under TILA, card means
"any card, plate, coupon book or other device existing for the purpose of obtaining money,
property, labor, or services." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(k) (2006). Under EFTA, card means "a card, code,
or other means of access to a consumer's account for the purpose of initiating electronic fund
transfers." § 1693(a)(1). The term "cardholder" is defined under TfLA, § 1602(m), but not under
EFTA. Because both statutes employ card, this Article uses cardholder to mean any consumer who
uses credit cards and electronic fund transfers available under TILA and EFTA, respectively.
159. The law does impose a maximum penalty of $50 for unauthorized charges until notice
is given. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (2006).
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goods and services.'60 As a lending device, the credit card provides the
cardholder with the option either to pay off the entire bill every month without
suffering financial charges or to pay the required minimum amount and incur
substantial financial charges on the unpaid charges.' 61 The law seems to
promote credit cards as a payment device that consumers should prefer. The
market also furnishes what has been called credit card goodies, such as cash
back rewards, discounts, rebates, and airline mileage points.' 62 These
promotions are invitations to debt.1 63 They are lending strategies that have little
to do with the credit card as a payment device. The following discussion
explores important nuances of the authorization principle as applied to
electronic payments.
The EPL creates several structural constraints to fortify the authorization
principle with respect to electronic payments. First, financial institutions cannot
issue credit or debit cards' 64 without a person's consent.' 65 This consent
constraint is designed to prevent predatory lending practices and electronic fund
transfer abuses. 66 In all cases, therefore, a card must be an accepted card, which
means that the cardholder has authorized the issuance of the card either to the
cardholder or to another person to use.' 6 7 The unsolicited issuance of credit
cards is a breach of the authorization principle, as it induces persons to use what
can be a risky method of payment.' The practice also harms lenders because
unscreened cardholders may engage in fraud and carry a higher risk of
160. See Gillian Garcia, Credit Cards: An Interdisciplinary Survey, 6 J. CONSUMER RES.
327, 327 (1980). The rich use the credit card as a payment device whereas the poor use it primarily
for the available credit. Id. at 329.
161. Only affluent cardholders are able to pay off the entire monthly bill. Adam J. Levitin,
Priceless? The Social Costs q/ Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 35
(2008). Levitin examines cognitive biases that enter into the dynamics of credit cards. Id. at 18-42.
162. Adam J. Levitin, Payment Wars: The Merchant-Bank Struggle/lbr Control o(f Payment
Systems, 12 STAN. J.L. BuS. & FIN. 425, 435 (2007) (citing Damon Darlin, G ft Horse to Consider."
Credit Cards that Reward, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2005, at Cl). High rewards credit cards charge
higher interchange fees from merchants, thus slashing merchants' profits Id. at 43. Merchants,
however, have no way of telling from the face of the card whether the card carries a higher
interchange fee. Id. at 435-36.
163. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373-74
(2004) (citing Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002 § 25, tbls.5 1,
652, 1164 & 1165) (noting that credit card debt constitutes a substantial part of consumer debt).
164. Here the phrase "debit card" includes electronic transfer of funds.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1693i(a) (2006).
166. See generally Comment, Unsolicited Merchandise: State and Federal Remedies/lbr a
Consumer Problem, 1970 DUKE L.J. 991 (1970) (discussing how unsolicited goods were pestering
consumers in the 1960s and 1970s, and regulation was needed to protect consumers against these
practices).
167. § 1602(l). But see § 1693i(b) (establishing that unsolicited debit cards can be issued
under certain defined circumstances).
168. Gillette, supra note 41, at 208-09.
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nonpayment. 169 Of course, a person is free not to use an unsolicited card.
However, given the human propensity to use readily available credit, unsolicited
credit cards can land cardholders in excessive debt beyond their paying
capacity. 170 Unsolicited debit cards may be hazardous even to the operation of
deposit accounts, particularly if the cardholder is unfamiliar with proper uses of
electronic fund transfers.
Second, each card transaction requires the cardholder's specific
authorization. In most cases, the cardholder must sign the credit card slip that
the merchant generates at the time of sale of goods and services.171 By signing
the slip, the cardholder authorizes the issuer to credit the merchant's account in
the approved amount and accordingly to charge the cardholder. 172 Internet
transactions require entering the cardholder's name and the billing address.
Furthermore, the cardholder must provide the card number, expiration date, and
special digits provided on the card in order to authorize the amount charged to
the card. 173 These logistical entries in credit card transactions affirm that the use
169. Alya Guseva & Akos Ronas-Tas, Uncertainty, Risk, and Trust. Russian and American
Credit Cards Markets Compared, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 623, 624 (2001) (noting that American banks
suffered serious losses in the 1950s and 1960s when they mass mailed unsolicited credit cards
without any prescreening for fraud and risk of nonpayment). The expansion of credit cards is
related to the credit score of the cardholder. See Kathleen W. Johnson, Recent Developments in the
Credit Card Market and the Financial Obligations Ratio, 91 FED. RES. BULL. 473, 475 (2005),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2005/autumn05_lead.pdf. The market has
designed a system under which cardholders with poor credit ratings pay higher interest rates. Id.
This risk-based pricing has increased the availability of credit cards for low income households. Id.
170. See William D. Warren, Consumer Credit Law: Rates, Costs, and Benefits, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 951, 951-52 (1975) (quoting John C. Weistart, Consumer Protection in the Credit Card
Industry: Federal Legislative Controls, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1475, 1499 (1972)) (noting that
consumers sought legislative protection against unsolicited credit cards). But see Weistart, supra,
at 1487-90 (arguing that unsolicited credit cards may not increase debt or inflation).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 763 F.2d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that credit
card sales slips carry express representations concerning account numbers, account owners, and
purchase amounts). When charging small amounts to credit cards, merchants may suspend the
signature requirement. Richard A. Epstein & Thomas P. Brown, Cybersecurity in the Payment
Card Industry, 75 U. Cmi. L. REV. 203, 210-11 (2008). This suspension promotes efficiency. The
absence of the signature requirement is still consistent with the authorization principle in that,
absent fraud, the swiping of the card for paying a charge is evidence of authorization. Thus, the
suspension of the signature requirement does not discard the principle of authorization but makes
the process of authorization easier. See id. (noting that speed is part of modern transactions and the
suspension of the signature requirement promotes speedy transactions).
172. Although credit card slips are still generated and signed, the clearance and settlement
of payment is done electronically. Financial institutions have replaced the previous method of
depositing credit card slips in the merchant's bank with automated payment processing. See
Gerdes, supra note 21, at 182. Credit card payments are now completely electronic. See id.
173. The three-digit security code located on the back of the card lets the merchant know
that the person ordering merchandise has physical possession of the card. See 3-Digit Security
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of the card is not accidental but deliberate and authorized. 174 These entries are
not fraud proof, nor do they provide conclusive evidence that the cardholder,
and not an unauthorized user, has entered the required information. 175 Absent
fraud, however, these entries evidence the cardholder's authorization for the
amount charged to the card account. Even in repeated uses of a credit card for
the same merchant, the cardholder must enter the amount and special digits to
authorize a new transaction. In the case of debit cards, the cardholder must use a
personal identification number (PIN) to authorize any transfer of funds.' 76 The
combined use of the card and the PIN assures authorization.' 77 The
authorization to charge an amount on the debit card with the use of the PIN is
more credible since the PIN, unlike the card identification number, is closely
held private information that only the cardholder supposedly possesses.78
The authorization principle, embodied in EPL, allows a cardholder to
authorize another person to use the card. 179 Corporations, businesses,
universities, and even ordinary persons may obtain cards for employees,
officers, agents, representatives, and family members.' Even though the
cardholder is liable for the amounts charged to the account, the authorized card
users may lawfully charge the cardholder's account.' Even though some
merchants require the cardholder's identification before charging the account,l2
EPL permits the cardholder to authorize another person to use the card. ls 3 In
Code, http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/visa-security-program/3-digit-security-code.htm
(last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
174. Gary Rice, Selected Issues Relating to Banking and the Internet, in STRATEGIES FOR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NEW E-COMMERCE ECONOMY 803, 902-03 (PLI Corp. Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B0-00E5, 1999), WL 1156 PLI/Corp 803.
175. Andres Rueda, The Implications of Strong Encryption Technology on Money
Laundering, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 30-31 (2001) (describing the Internet fraud related to
credit cards).
176. See Clayton P. Gillette & Steven D. Walt, Unifbrmity and Diversity in Payment
Systems, 83 CM.-KENT L. REV. 499, 518 (2008).
177. See id.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Ragosta, 970 F.2d 1085, 1087 (2nd Cir. 1999) (noting that,
typically, the bank customer is the only person who knows the PIN).
179. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(a)(2) n.21 (2008).
180. The definition of a cardholder allows flexibility under which a person may agree with
the card issuer to pay obligations arising from the issuance of a credit card to another person. See
15 U.S.C. § 1602(m) (2006); see also id. § 1645 (discussing a similar provision for business credit
cards issued to ten or more employees).
181. See, e.g., Martin v. Am. Express, Inc., 361 So. 2d 597, 599 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978)
(holding that a cardholder who "voluntarily permits the use of his (or her) credit card by another
person" authorizes the use of a card).
182. See, e.g., Mary Elizabeth Matthews, Credit Cards-Authorized and Unauthorized Use,
13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 233, 238 (1994) (explaining that merchants enter into specific contracts
with merchant banks regarding the verification procedures of the use of credit cards).
183. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(a)(2) n.21.
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fact, for credit cards, the law allows a much broader scope of authorization in
that the card bearer may have the cardholder's "actual, implied, or apparent"
authorization to use the card. 18 4 In electronic fund transfers, however, the law
requires that the card bearer have the cardholder's actual authority.' 85 When a
cardholder delivers the PIN information to a card bearer, the information
delivery constitutes actual authorization; accordingly, the bank may lawfully
charge the cardholder's account for amounts the card bearer has charged.186
The authorization principle is no mere formality. It is anchored in
information-based operational guidance. Therefore, consumers of payment
services need to have the critical information about transaction costs of using
different payment devices. Cash payments impose the least transaction costs;
187
however, carrying cash is potentially risky. Among money-substitutes,
payments by check or electronic transfers also impose minimal transaction
costs, even though account holders may incur fees for maintaining deposit
accounts. 188 However, the use of credit cards may impose substantial transaction
costs on cardholders.' 89 The authorization principle, therefore, demands that
lenders disclose credit terms so that cardholders use payment services on the
basis of informed consent.' 90 A meaningful disclosure of credit terms includes
information about the annual percentage rate, finance charge determination,
minimum periodic payments, late payment penalties, grace period, and methods
for correcting billing errors.191 The authorization principle loses meaning when
184. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(o) (2006).
185. See id. § 1693a(l 1).
186. See id. § 1963(a)(ll)(A) (providing that a cardholder who grants actual authority to
third party is liable for third party's transactions until the card issuer has notice that such
cardholder has revoked such authority). However, a bank must investigate unauthorized transfers
that a cardholder claims even though the ATM card and the PTN remained in possession of the
cardholder during the period of unauthorized transfers. Wilson v. Harris N.A., No. 06 C 5840,
2007 WL 2608521, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept 4, 2007).
187. See Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Costs of1 Credit Card Merchant
Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1322-23 (2008) (citing David Humphrey et al., What Does it
Cost to Make a Payment?, 2 REV. NETWORK ECON. 159, 162-63 (2003)).
188. U.C.C. Article 4A, Prefatory Note (1989) (stating that a transfer of many millions of
dollars can be made for a price of a few dollars).
189. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein et al., Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust
Economics Card Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 591 (2006) (listing fees commonly
imposed on cardholders, including finance charges and per-transaction fees).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006).
191. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Credit Where it Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act
and its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 631 (2005) (critiquing TILA for its complexity and failing
to require disclosure of credit information in an adequate, simple, and timely manner) (citing
William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need .or Mortgage Rules
Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan
Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1128-30 (1984); Jonathan M. Landers & Ralph J. Rohner, A
Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26 UCLA L. REV. 711,715-16 (1979)).
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cardholders use credit cards with a biased knowledge of credit terms.' 9 2 The
cardholder's liability may be adjusted, even discharged, in cases where the
creditors deliberately or deceptively withheld disclosure of material credit
terms.
Electronic payments between businesses or financial institutions, known as
wire transfers, are covered under Article 4A of the UCC.193 Although the law of
wire transfers shares features with other payment systems, it is nonetheless
unique. 194 Despite this uniqueness, the authorization principle is the foundation
of Article 4A.195 Ordinarily, the customer authorizes the payment order for any
transfer of funds.' 96 The receiving bank verifies the authenticity of the payment
order pursuant to security procedures.' 97 If the security procedure verifies a
payment order to be authentic, even an unauthorized order is effective., 98 In
giving effect to an unauthorized order, the rule appears to conflict with the
authorization principle. Upon further examination, however, we find that the
security procedure must be a "commercially reasonable method of providing
security against unauthorized payment orders."' 99 A prudent customer will not
open an "authorized account" with a bank unless the customer is satisfied with
the security procedure. 20 By opening an authorized account, the customer
192. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Refbrm" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV.
1481, 1560 (2006) (citing Richard A. Wiener et al., Unwrapping Assumptions: Applying Social
Analytic Jurisprudence to Consumer Bankruptcy Education Requirements and Policy, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 453, 454-55 (2005)) (describing how disclosure of credit terms may be ineffective
when lenders exploit cardholders' decision making biases).
193. See U.C.C. Article 4A, Prefatory Note (1989). Whereas the EFTA regulates consumer
electronic transfers, Article 4A regulates commercial electronic transfers. Id.
194. Id.; see also James Steven Rogers, The New Old Law ofElectronic Money, 58 SMU L.
REV. 1253, 1257-60 (2005) (explaining the common feature between wire transfers and check
collection).
195. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4A-202(a) (1989) ("A payment order received by the receiving bank
is the authorized order of the person identified as send if that person authorized the order .... ").
The very title of this section is "Authorized and Verified Payment Orders." U.C.C. § 4A-202.
What is a commercially reasonable security procedure is a question of law. U.C.C. § 4A-202(c).
Yet, "the wishes of the customer expressed to the bank" is a factor in determining the
reasonableness of the security procedure. Id. Furthermore, the customer may choose a security
procedure other than the one the bank offers. Id. Most important, the customer agrees in writing to
be bound even by unauthorized payment orders in compliance with the security procedure that the
customer chooses. Id. A reasoning of these rules clarifies that a customer's acceptance or choice of
a security procedure, critical to wire transfers, is part of the authorization principle as applied to
payment orders under Article 4A.




200. U.C.C. § 4A-105(1), (3).
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accepts-and authorizes-the bank's commercially reasonable security
procedure as a method of verification of payment orders. In other words, the
customer authorizes the security procedure as a method of verification of the
customer's payment orders. Accordingly, the customer is liable when the
security procedure verifies an unauthorized payment order.20 1 The authorization
principle is not only order-specific, but it is also embedded in the security
procedure that the customer has elected to complete its payment orders.
2 0 2
C. No Authorization, No Liability




The negative implication of the principle-no authorization, no liability-is
also valid but to a lesser extent, as explained in Part Till. The negative
implication of the principle, however, is explicitly recognized in the law of
payment systems. The NIL declares that an unauthorized signature, except that
of the signer, is ineffective. 204 Thus, a person-be it the drawer, maker,
indorser, accommodation party, or any other party-is not liable on the• - • I20520
instrument if the person's signature is unauthorized. A person 20 may
interpose a real defense to payment if the person's authorization is inherently
defective. 20 7 Signatures obtained under duress or under fraudulent inducement
that muddied the character of the instrument or its essential terms are examples
of inherently flawed authorizations that cannot create a lawful obligation to pay
201. U.C.C. § 4A-202(b).
202. U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 1. Thus, the authorization principle in the conventional sense of
a principal authorizing its agent is not helpful. The wire transfer is not comparable to payment by a
check. Wire transfers may be executed on the basis of a message received on a computer screen.
The identity of a person sending the message may be not apparent or even determinable. As such,
the authorization of a named person is not always applicable to wire transfer orders. In wire
transfers, the receiving bank relies on the security procedure. And a payment order is authorized if
it passes the security procedure. Id.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
204. U.C.C. § 3-401(a), 3-403(a) (2002).
205. U.C.C. § 3-401. However, a represented person is liable on the instrument even though
that person does not sign the instrument. U.C.C. § 3-402(a).
206. Article 3 uses the word "obligor" to prescribe real defenses. See U.C.C. § 3-305(a).
This is inaccurate drafting since the word obligor implies that the person is obligated but for a
defense. In the context of personal defenses, the word obligor is accurate. However, this word is
confusing-indeed inaccurate-when used in the context of real defenses. A person who has real
defenses against payment is not an obligor in any sense of the word.
207. The NIL presents two distinct types of defenses-real and personal. Real defenses are
available against all payees regardless of their status as holders in due course. U.C.C. § 3-
305(a)(1). Personal defenses are unavailable against holders in due course. U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(2).




Khan: A Theoretical Analysis of Payment Systems
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVTEW
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the instrument. Inherently flawed authorization is no authorization at all-it
is void ab initio.
The EPL evidences the negative implication of the authorization principle.
A cardholder is not liable for unauthorized charges, 20 9 although the law charges
a minimal amount for unauthorized charges if the cardholder fails to report the
210loss of the card in a timely manner. This penalty does not weaken the
authorization principle, nor should it be seen as an exception to the principle.
Though the law is drafted in terms of the cardholder's obligation for
unauthorized charges, the law is geared more toward imposing a penalty for not
reporting the loss of the card rather than creating an exception to theS • 211
authorization principle. Lenders, and not cardholders, suffer huge losses
when stolen and lost cards are unlawfully charged.2 12 This shift of loss from
cardholders to lenders is consistent with the authorization principle because
cardholders do not authorize payments on stolen and lost cards.
Under agency principles, a cardholder may authorize another person to use
213the card for buying goods and services. The card bearer may sign his own
name or the name of the cardholder to authorize a particular transaction. That
the card bearer has forged the signature of the cardholder to authorize a
transaction poses no difficulty in charging the cardholder's credit account.
2 14
"[W]here a cardholder voluntarily and knowingly allows another to use his card
and that person subsequently misuses the card," courts in most jurisdictions
have held that the agent had apparent authority to lawfully charge the
cardholder's account.
208. See U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(l)(ii)-(iii).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (2006).
210. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)(1), (4) (2008); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1643, 1693g (2007) (listing
the liability of cardholders for unauthorized charges).
211. See Gilbert M. Schroeder, Claims Under Financial Institution Bonds.fbr Losses Due to
Credit Card Chargebacks, BRIEF, Summer 2004, at 24, 24-25; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1643, 1693g
(establishing that the cardholder is liable for unauthorized charges or transfers). Because both
sections cap liability, the law serves more as an incentive to report the loss or theft of the card. See
MANN, supra note 23, at 149-50.
212. Gillette & Walt, supra note 176, at 505-08.
213. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(o); see also Permobil, Inc. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co.,
571 F. Supp. 2d 825, 828 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (reporting that the company obtained credit cards for
its employees with the name of the company and the authorized employee's name on each
employee card).
214. See Stieger v. Chevy Chase Sav. Bank, 666 A.2d 479, 484 (D.C. 1995).
215. Id. at 482-83 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Martin v. Am. Express, Inc.,
361 So. 2d 597, 601 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978)); see also Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v.
Web, Inc., 405 S.E.2d 652, 654 (Ga. 1991) (citing Martin, 361 So. 2d at 600) (holding company
liable for employee's misuse of the credit card); Oclander v. First Nat'l Bank of Louisville, 700
S.W.2d 804, 806 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (holding wife liable for estranged husband's charges); Cities
Serv. Co. v. Pailet, 452 So. 2d 319, 322 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (holding employer liable for
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The cardholder may authorize a merchant to charge the card for future fixed
216or variable liabilities. Until the cardholder revokes authorization, the
merchant may charge the card according to the terms of authorization. The
authorization principle, however, needs clarification when a cardholder instructs
a merchant not to charge the card over a certain limit. This scenario may arise
when a cardholder authorizes another person to use the card but advises the
merchant not to allow the card bearer to charge the card over a certain
amount. 217 Here, restrictive authorization extended to the merchant competes
218with apparent authority given to the card bearer. The merchant may refuse to
accept such restrictive authorization, but if the merchant accepts the restriction,
the authorization principle binds the merchant not to charge the cardholder over
the authorized amount. The restrictive authorization communicated to the
merchant subsumes the apparent authority of the card bearer. The enforcement
of the restriction may be cumbersome and may even impose prohibitive
enforcement costs on the merchant. But the cardholder cannot be subjected to
charges over the authorized amount. The merchant can disallow the card bearer
to charge over the specified amount. If the merchant fails to enforce the
restriction, however, the cardholder is not liable for charges over the authorized
amount.219
employee's charges outside the scope of the business trip); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672
P.2d 73, 76 (Utah 1983) (holding wife liable for husband's charges despite wife's notification to
the bank that her husband was no longer an authorized user); Mastercard v. Town of Newport, 396
N.W.2d 345, 348 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (holding the town liable for town clerk's personal charges).
216. For example, the EFTA allows preauthorized electronic fund transfers that are
"authorized in advance to recur at substantially regular intervals." 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(9) (2007).
217. See, e.g., Steiger, 666 A.2d at 479 ("Where a credit cardholder... voluntarily permits
the use of his or her credit card by another person, the cardholder has authorized the use of that
card and is thereby responsible for any charges as a result of that use, even if he or she requested
that the other person not charge over a certain amount or make charges on it for specified
purposes." (citing Standard Oil Co. v. Steele, 489 N.E.2d 842, 844 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1985))).
218. See, e.g., Towers World Airways v. PHI Aviation Sys. Inc., 933 F.2d 174, 177 (2d
Cir. 1991) ("Unlike express or implied authority, however, apparent authority exists entirely apart
from the principal's manifestations of consent to the agent. Rather, the cardholder, as principal,
creates apparent authority through words or conduct that, reasonably interpreted by a third party
from whom the card bearer makes purchases, indicate that the card user acts with the cardholder's
consent.").
219. Courts, however, are reluctant to place restrictive liability on card issuers even if the
cardholder gives notice of restriction. Towers World Airways, 933 F.2d at 179 (rejecting the
placing of an unrealistic burden on the card issuer to convey to numerous merchants whatever
limitations the cardholder has placed on the card user's authority).
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1I. NEGLIGENCE PRINCIPLE
The negligence principle is the second principle of the theoretical code of
payment systems. Ordinarily, alterations and forged signatures impose no
liability on the purported obligor, as these actions are contrary to the
220authorization principle. An instrument that carries an alteration or a forged
signature is not properly payable and may be lawfully dishonored. 2 2 , However,
the authorization principle ceases to determine the liability of a party whose
222negligence substantially contributes to alteration or a forged signature. The
negligent party is denied the benefits of the authorization principle and is held
223
liable under the negligence principle. For instance, a drawer whose failure to
exercise ordinary care substantially contributes to altering the amount of the
check from $10 to $10,000 cannot rely on the authorization principle to assert• • - 224
that the drawer is liable only for $10. The negligent drawer is accountable for
the full, altered amount of $10,000, which the payor bank has paid in good faith
225and without notice of the alteration. Hence, the negligence principle is
essentially a loss allocation criterion.
The exercise of care in legal transactions is a cardinal principle of the legal
system. The breach of a duty of care-negligence-is actionable and carries
226legal consequences. As in many other areas of law, the negligence principle is
an essential part of payment systems law. In its simplest formulation, the
220. See U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 1 (2002).
221. Id.
222. U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (2002).
223. The negligence principle is distinguishable from the concept of negligence in tort. This
distinction is critical. The tort negligence theory is confined to losses suffered to persons or
property. See, e.g., Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 175 (3d Cir. 2008)
("The Economic Loss Doctrine provides that no cause of action exists for negligence that results
solely in economic damages unaccompanied by physical or property damage."). This caution is
also flagged in Article 3. See U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 1.
224. U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 3. Article 3 defines alteration as an "unauthorized" change that
may modify the obligation of a party. U.C.C. § 3-407(a). Thus, alteration is conceptually
antithetical to the authorization principle. Under some circumstances, however, when the party's
negligent conduct causes the alteration, the negligence principle-and not the authorization
principle-should control the determination of liability. U.C.C. § 3-407 cmt. 2 (stating that the
party that left the instrument incomplete is liable when the instrument is completed, though without
authorization).
225. Id. The rule was first articulated in a nineteenth century common law case, Young v.
Grote, (1827) 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (K.B.).
226. See, e.g., Ralph D. Mawdsley, Parent Liability .br the Intentional Acts of Their
Children Under Common Law Negligence Theories and Parental Responsibility Statutes, 230
EDt C. L. REP. 469, 472 (2008) (showing that courts apply the negligence principle to the conduct
of parents); Darpana M. Sheth, Better Qff Unborn? An Analysis of Wrongfid Birth and Wrong/id
Lift Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 73 TENN. L. REV. 641, 645 (2006) (stating
that physician's breach of duty was the basis of malpractice action).
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negligence principle requires persons to issue, transfer, debit, and credit
227payment orders with care. If a person processing a payment device does so
negligently, the person is liable for the loss attributable to negligent conduct. In
enforcing the negligence principle in payment systems, the law may in some
cases require proof of negligent conduct before assigning loss to the negligent
person, while in other cases the law may presume negligence and accordingly
allocate the loss.
2 28
The following discussion demonstrates that the negligence principle is not
evenly applied to payment devices. The negligence principle's application to
negotiable instruments is pervasive and robust. The principle's application to
the law of credit cards is disguised. The principle is noticeably present in
electronic fund transfers, but its application is not as vigorous as it is with
negotiable instruments. These varying applications of the negligence principle




The NIL defines "general negligence 229 as a "failure to exercise ordinary
care" that "substantially contributes to alteration or forged signature on anS,,230
instrument. " General negligence is thus associated with two wrongs:
231
alteration and forged signature. In most cases, the wrong of alteration
involves an unauthorized change in the amount of money to be paid on the
instrument. However, any unauthorized change that modifies a party's liability
232constitutes alteration. The wrong of forged signature includes the purported
signature of maker, drawer, drawee, indorser, accommodation party, or any
227. The phrase "payment order" is not used as defined in UCC section 4A-103(a)(l). I use
the phrase in a more generic sense to include any order to a financial institution to debit or credit
an account.
228. Professor Robert Cooter must be credited for making the distinction between general
negligence and presumptive negligence. See Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory qf"
Loss Allocation fbr Consumer Payments, 66 TEX. L. REV. 63, 64 (1987). The UCC presumes
negligence in sections 3-405(b) (employer liability) and 3-404 (liability for instruments issued to
impostors and fictitious payees).
229. Article 3 does not use the expression general negligence. This phrase, however, is
analytically useful in distinguishing different manifestations of negligence recognized in the law.
See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 228.
230. U.C.C. § 3-406(a).
231. Id. This section deals only with forged signature and alteration.
232. U.C.C. § 3-407(a).
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other party to the instrument. 233 The liability arising from general negligence is
not confined to the issuer of the instrument but applies to all parties that may
process the instrument. As such, the negligence principle is thoroughly
interwoven with all parties to, and processes of, negotiable instruments. A more
detailed discussion of general negligence-highlighting the logistics of ordinary
care and substantial contribution-will assist in later determining whether the
negligence principle is, or ought to be, applied to electronic payments.
234General negligence stems from a party's failure to exercise ordinary care.
The statutory standard of care prescribed to assess the negligent conduct is party
235specific. The standard of care raises two important questions: Where is the
party located? And what type of business does the party do? Answers to these
questions determine whether the party has engaged in statutorily negligent
conduct. The location of the party is critical because the prescribed standard of
236care is not national or universal in scope. No one standard of care governs all
localities in which instruments are issued, negotiated, or paid. Parties located in
metropolitan areas may observe a standard of care that might be too oppressive
for parties located in small towns. Furthermore, the standard of care may vary
from business to business. A party is judged for negligence according to the
reasonable commercial standards with respect to the business in which the party
is engaged. Hence the failure to exercise ordinary care consists of the combined
norms of commercial standards prevailing in the party's locality and
237business.
General negligence also requires that the negligent conduct "substantially
238contribute" to the alteration or forged signature. The substantial contribution
test is not as stringent as the "direct and proximate cause" test.239 The causation
of a wrong can be highly complex and even indeterminate in that no legal
jargon can definitively capture the calculus of contributions that eventually
233. See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(8).
234. See U.C.C. § 3-406(a). Although the language of the section refers to preclusion of a
negligent party from asserting alteration or forgery against a person who in good faith pays the
instrument or takes it for value or collection, the preclusion is designed to shift the loss to the
negligent party. Because failure to exercise ordinary care is negligence, section 3-406 incorporates
liability imposing general negligence and not mere preclusion. For the use of the concept of
negligence that contributes to alteration, see U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 1. This concept of negligence in
payment systems, however, must not be confused with negligence in tort. Id.
235. See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7), (9).
236. See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(9) (establishing that the standard of care is the observance of
reasonable commercial standards prevailing in the area in which the person is located).
237. For example, banks engaged in the automated processing of instruments are not
required to examine the instruments provided the practice complies with the standard of ordinary
care. See id.
238. U.C.C. § 3-406(a).
239. U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 2.
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produce an alteration or a forged signature. The law holds a party liable on the
instrument if the party's neglicnt conduct is a substantial factor in the chain of
events that produced a wrong.
Comparative negligence adds to the uncertainty of fact-based litigation.24 1
The NIL allows a negligent party to show that another party has also been
negligent in processing or paying the instrument. 24 2 It is hard to imagine that a
party charged with general negligence would roll over and accept liability. More
likely, the allegedly negligent party would not only contest the charges of
negligence but would also plead the plaintiff's negligence. This double-
headed-and possibly poly-headed-pleading of general negligence turns the... . 243 . ..
case into an expensive contest of facts. " The cost of litigation multiplies as
each allegedly negligent party defends its contribution to the loss. In addition to
increasing the cost of litigation, the outcome of a fact-based negligence case is
hard to predict. 244 The risk of losing a case, after incurring substantial
transaction costs, 245 makes little sense if the contested amount of the instrument
is smaller than the transaction costs.
The logistics of ordinary care, substantial contribution, and comparative
fault are all heavily fact-based legal concepts. The litigants will incur substantial
transaction costs in gathering and in disputing facts to establish or deny a
party's breach of ordinary care. 246 This is so because the establishment of
actionable negligent conduct would require gathering facts about commercial
standards in the party's locality as well as in the party's business.
247
Furthermore, though easier to satisfy than the direct and proximate cause test,
the fact-based substantial contribution test adds cost to litigation as well.
240. U.C.C. § 3-406(a). The law leaves it to the court and the jury to determine the
negligent conduct that caused alteration. U.C.C. § 3-406(a) cmt. 1.
241. See, e.g., Overby, supra note 112, at 371 (examining the impact of comparative
negligence on litigation and arguing that banks have been able to shift the loss of forged checks to
account holders with greater ease).
242. UCC sections 3-404(d), 3-405(b), 3-406(b), and 4-406(e) all allow for the concept of
comparative negligence, which potentially minimizes the account holder's liability by showing that
the bank failed to exercise ordinary care in paying instruments or items.
243. One way to reduce litigation costs is to stipulate facts. See, e.g., Sipl v. Sentry Indem.
Co., 431 N.W.2d 685, 688 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) ("It is, of course, entirely proper for parties to
avoid litigation costs by stipulating to uncontested facts-or by agreeing not to contest some facts
they might dispute.").
244. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 45, § 16-3, at 74 (commenting that comparative
negligence invites the plaintiff to roll the dice with the jury).
245. Used here, transaction costs include attorney's fees, court fees, and other expenses
incurred to prosecute or to defend a case.
246. Ordinary care is a standard defined in terms of specific business and locality in which
the business is located. U.C.C. § 3-103(9). In the case of businesses, this standard is fact-specific.
Id. cmt. 5. In case of banks, the law seems to allow automated means. Id.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 236-37.
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No empirical studies are available to demonstrate whether comparative
negligence inducted in the NIL sponsors or suppresses litigation. Professional
wisdom, however, reveals that litigation costs associated with a poly-headed
negligence case, plus the risk of an uncertain outcome, may persuade parties to
settle the case and split the loss. 248 Of course, some cases may still be litigated
and the losing party may have to pay expenses, including the attorney's fees, to
the winner. But in many cases, parties would choose to split the loss in a fair
proportion rather than incur litigation costs for an uncertain outcome.
249
To nudge parties toward settlement and fair apportionment of loss, courts
must not allow summary judgment to circumvent allegedly negligent
conduct. 25° Payor banks, however, have been successful in obtaining summary
251judgment through the observance of reasonable commercial standards -a
252
trend that defeats the raison d'etre of comparative negligence. To obtain
summary judgment more readily, payor banks may establish little care as
253ordinary care so that negligence charges fail to assert a triable issue of fact.
For example, payor banks have adopted "bulk processing of checks, which does.. . . ... . ,254 •255
not include sight review for signature verification as ordinary care. Under
this standard of care, account holders are out of luck in asserting comparative
negligence against banks for bypassing forged or fraudulent signatures. Payor
banks may adopt a no sight review procedure to avoid check processing costs,
since signature verification consumes resources. Fairness demands, however,
248. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes
and Their Resolution, 27 J. EcoN. LIT. 1067, 1085 n.29, 1090 (1989) (claiming that parties who
spend resources to increase precaution are better off avoiding litigation and reducing liability); see
also Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case .br Comparative Negligence, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (1986) (arguing that comparative negligence is economically efficient).
But see Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 40 (1972) (arguing that
comparative negligence is contrary to equitable loss distribution).
249. Commentators offer various economic models to rationalize and propose settlements.
See, e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal to Halve Litigation Costs, 91 VA.
L. REV. 1721, 1721 (2005) (proposing the awarding of double damages in cases that reach trial).
250. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Good, 737 A.2d 690, 696 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999) (reversing trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of bank on issue of exercise
of ordinary care).
251. See, e.g., Espresso Roma Corp. v. Bank of Am., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549, 556 (Dist. Ct.
App. 2002) (upholding summary judgment in favor of banks on the issue of exercising ordinary
care).
252. Comparative negligence does not presuppose that all parties involved in an injury share
fault. However, a party may not avoid fault by adopting an unacceptable standard of care. Banks
should not be allowed to avoid liability by adopting an automation process that cannot detect fraud
or alteration.
253. See Overby, supra note 112, at 379-80. The banks may adopt a no-sight review
procedure provided they are prepared to share a reasonable portion of the loss.
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that payor banks pay a fair portion of the loss if its no sight review procedure
fails to catch the drawer's forged signature for which the negligent drawer is
partly responsible.
2. Electronic Payments
In vivid contrast to negotiable instruments, the EPL imposes no general
negligence liability on cardholders, card bearers, merchants, or card issuers.
Regardless of the unauthorized amount charged to the card, the law imposes a
256minimal penalty on cardholders if they fail to report loss or theft of the card.
The cardholder suffers no damages if the cardholder's general negligence
257produces unauthorized charges. If Congress were to reform the EPL in the
image of the NIL, the cardholder would be liable if the cardholder's failure to
exercise ordinary care substantially contributed to fraudulent charges. If the
merchant and the card issuer were also negligent in processing and paying
fraudulent charges, the loss would be allocated under the comparative
negligence analysis.
Furthermore, under the force of general negligence, the cardholder would
be liable for charges even on stolen and lost cards. The question would turn on
whether the cardholder's failure to exercise ordinary care substantially
contributed to the loss or theft of the card. In its present form, the EPL imposes
no duty of care to safeguard credit and debit cards, even though most
cardholders panic if their cards are lost or stolen-often under the mistaken
notion that they will be liable for all charges made on the lost or stolen cards.
Even the more informed cardholders, who know that the law caps the maximum
liability for unauthorized charges at $50, 25 8 carefully protect their cards and
make little delay in reporting any loss or theft of the card. This natural instinct
to protect cards and report their loss or theft indicates a firmly rooted dynamic
of care in human behavior. A reformed EPL imposing a duty of care in
safekeeping cards would be in harmony with natural behavior.
The absence of general negligence liability in the EPL does not mean that
negligent losses are nonexistent or rare with respect to credit cards and
electronic fund transfers. Lending institutions suffer annual losses due to
259unauthorized charges on lost and stolen credit cards. However, the system is
256. See infra notes 312, 318 and accompanying text.
257. Mark E. Budnitz, Commentary, Technology as the Driver of Payment System Rules:
Will Consumers Be Provided Seatbelts and Air Bags?, 83 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 909, 922 (2008).
258. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (2006) (stating that liability is capped at $50); id. § 1693g(a)
(stating that liability is capped at $50 if the cardholder reports the loss or theft of the card within
two business days after consumer learns of the loss or theft).
259. Brian F. Caminer, Credit Card Fraud: The Neglected Crime, 76 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 746, 746-47 (1985).
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not designed to determine whether the individual cardholder substantially
contributed to loss or theft of the card. The financial institutions aggregate
losses and pass them on to cardholders under the guise of interest rates and
fees. 2 60 At the systemic level, therefore, it would be inaccurate to say that
cardholders are not liable for general negligence with respect to electronic
payments. Congress has not formally adopted the general negligence principle
into the EPL, but the law allows financial institutions to hold cardholders liable
as a group for losses. Because no data on negligence is gathered or shared with
the public, financial institutions can pass all losses on to cardholders, regardless
of whether cardholders' general negligence substantially contributes to lost or
stolen cards.
The allocation of losses resulting from negligence can be person-specific or
group-specific. Compare the NIL with the EPL: The NIL is person-specific, as
it holds each negligent party to the instrument accountable for the loss, whereas
the EPL is group-specific, as it allows lenders to distribute general negligence
losses to consumers of credit. Hence, the law may choose between fairness and
systemic efficiency in order to distribute losses. Fairness allocates losses on the
basis of fault, whereas systemic efficiency bypasses fault and distributes losses
to the users of the system.
Under the EPL, the lender's liability is somewhat analogous to the
manufacturer's strict liability when selling a dangerous product. 261 The
manufacturer pays the injured consumer of the product under strict liability-
regardless of the consumer's fault-and passes on lawsuit and settlement losses
to consumers by raising the price of the product. 26 2 For the EPL, a similar
dynamic is at work. Under strict liability, the lender assumes all risk of loss and
theft of cards. The individual cardholder is not liable for general negligence that
contributes to loss or theft of the card. By an invisible hand, however, the lender
passes negligence losses on to consumers of credit. Under the law of products
liability, corrective efficiency compensates the injured consumer without regard
260. See, e.g., Jim Hawkins, Renting the Good Lift, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041, 2085
(2008) (noting that merchants bundle the credit card transaction costs into goods and services and
pass these costs on to buyers) (citing Levitin, supra note 161, at 3).
261. See generally William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). Prosser was one of the original champions of strict liability
for defective products.
262. Deterrence and corrective justice are two major camps that divide torts scholars.
Corrective justice, or loss distribution, aims at compensating the victims regardless of fault. This
view of torts is more like insurance with an emphasis on a collective, rather than an individual,
approach to the problem. Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin,
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 329, 347 (2007) (quoting DON DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING TME DOMAIN
OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOU SLY 5-10 (1996)). But see Peter M. Gerhart, The
Death o.fStrict Liability, 56 BtTFF. L. REV. 245, 250-51 (2008) (arguing that strict liability should
be replaced with negligence derived from individual moral responsibility).
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to fault. 263 Under the EPL, the principle of corrective efficiency explains why
no individual cardholder, even if at fault, is saddled with a monetary penalty.
Both laws ignore individual fault and distribute aggregate losses to an entire
group of consumers.
B. Presumed Negligence
In addition to general negligence, payment systems presume negligence
under certain circumstances and hold the negligent person liable for
unauthorized payments. Presumed negligence is a species of negligence that
needs no proof. It speaks for itself-a manifestation of res ipsa loquitur-as in
the famous "case of a collision between two trains upon the same line, and both
being the property and under the management of the same Company.,
264
Presumed negligence is inferred from a set of circumstances. It may also be
established as a matter of law.
Economically, presumed negligence adopts the cheapest cost avoider rule
that clarifies conduct, guarantees efficiency, and allocates risk of unauthorized
payment services to the person best situated to avoid the loss with minimal cost.
The cheapest cost avoider rule would require the party that can prevent or
265minimize loss at the lowest cost overall to undertake the requisite action. The
party that violates the cheapest cost avoider rule is presumed negligent and
therefore liable for the loss. 266 Presumed negligence is therefore a more efficient
263. It appears to me, however, that corrective efficiency is a better description because
manufacturers pass on the losses to consumers of the product. Justice rarely recommends the
passing of the loss to someone else; efficiency is famed for doing so.
264. Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (Exch. Div.). For a superb analysis of
the case and the attendant concept of res ipsa loquitur, see G. Gregg Webb, The Law of Falling
Objects: Byrne v. Boadle and the Birth of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1077-79
(2007). A Tennessee court characterized res ipsa loquitur as the rule of presumed negligence. See
Quinley v. Cocke, 192 S.W.2d 992, 997 (Tenn. 1946). One commentator uses the phrase
"presumed negligence" specifically in reference to UCC section 4-406(d). See Neil 0. Littlefield,
Payments: Articles 3, 4, and 4A, 54 BuS. LAW. 1865, 1877 (1999). Notably, in specific
circumstances, Italian jurisprudence uses the concept of presumed negligence whereby negligence
need not be proved but is simply inferred. See Richard H. Dreyfuss, The Italian Law on Strict
Products Liability, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 37, 38 (1997).
265. In preventing environmental pollution, the cheapest cost avoider rule (or principle)
would modify the absolute application of "the polluter pays" rule. See DIETER SCIHMIDTCIHEN ET
AL., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF LAW & ECON., T-E INTERNALISATION OF EXTERNAL COSTS IN
TRANSPORT: FROM THE POLLUTER PAYS TO THE CHEAPEST COST AVOIDER PRINCIPLE (2007),
available at http://www.iru.org/index/cms-filesystem-action?file=PPP/enCCAP-Study-full.pdf.
266. David L. Mengle, Legal and Regulatory Refbrm in Electronic Payments: An
Evaluation of Payment Finality Rules, in THE U.S. PAYMENT SYSTEM: EFFICIENCY, RISK, AND
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 145, 155 (David B. Humphrey ed., 1990) (arguing that
assigning losses to the cheapest cost avoider result in minimum costs); see also Ada Long-Croom,
Unauthorized and Forged Indorsements: A Glitch in Revised Article 3 of the Unifbrm Commercial
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and more cost effective rule than general negligence, which imposes transaction
costs to establish negligent conduct.
The following discussion demonstrates that the law of negotiable
instruments and electronic fund transfers relies on both presumed negligence
and the attendant cheapest cost avoider rule to shift loss, under certain
prescribed circumstances, from financial institutions to account holders.
However, the law of credit cards does not fully recognize presumed negligence,
and therefore, it appears to violate the cheapest cost avoider rule.
1. Negotiable Instruments and Electronic Fund Transfers
The NIL and EFTA employ presumed negligence in two distinct cases:
employee fraud and the account holder's duty to discover and report
unauthorized payments. In each case, the account holder who occupies the
cheapest cost position to avoid loss but fails to act bears the loss.
a. Employee Fraud
The NIL relies on presumed negligence to shift loss from banks to account
holders. Employee fraud is a recurrent source of loss 2 67 that the NIL may
transfer to employers on the basis of presumed negligence. Even a modest
business may entrust a special employee-known as a cashier, treasurer, or
accountant-to process negotiable instruments. These entrusted employees are
authorized to sign outgoing checks drawn on the business account to pay off
268creditors. Businesses may also authorize these employees to indorse and
deposit incoming checks in the business account. The employees entrusted with
checks occupy a strategic position to embezzle funds. They may divert
incoming and outgoing checks to their personal account. 269 They may issue
Code, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 349, 349-52 (1997) (explaining how certain loss allocation rules
violate the cheapest cost avoider rule).
267. Businesses and banks lose billions of dollars via employee fraud. See Mark Lipman &
W.R. McGraw, Employee Theft: A $40 Billion Industry, 498 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC.
51, 52 (1988). The social implications of employee fraud are enormous. Some businesses go
bankrupt. See id. Tax revenues decrease. See id. Corporations may have downsized and cut jobs.
When jobs are endangered, threatened employees are more inclined to engage in theft, ultimately
completing a vicious cycle. See id. The National Check Fraud Center showed that businesses lose
$10 billion dollars annually through check fraud. National Check Fraud Center, Check Fraud
Statistics, http://www.ckfraud.org/statistics.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2009). All loss, however, is
not due to the employee fraud.
268. WHiTE & SUMMERS, supra note 45, § 16-4, at 78.
269. In all such cases, the employees would forge the signature of the creditor or
fraudulently indorse the signature of the employer. The NIL provides a technical solution by
creating a legal fiction that all fraudulent or forged indorsements made by an entrusted employee
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checks to fictitious creditors and to nonexistent employees while depositing
them into their own accounts. Businesses lose billions of dollars due to variant
strains of employee fraud.27 °
If there was no negligence principle, the employer could invoke the
authorization principle to assert that banks could not lawfully collect or pay
checks with the employee's fraudulent indorsement. Technically, a check with a
271forged indorsement is not a properly payable item. Accordingly, the employer
should be able to plead conversion of incoming checks wrongfully paid to the
fraudulent employee. Similarly, the employer should be able to argue that
company checks issued to fictitious creditors or to nonexistent employees lack
the employer's authorization and are not properly payable. Likewise, company
checks issued to legitimate creditors should not be properly payable if the
fraudulent employee forged the creditors' indorsements and diverted the funds.
These arguments are consistent with the authorization principle and would,
under a pure theory of authorization, shift the loss to banks that collect forged
272checks for, or pay to, the fraudulent employee. The arguments derived from
the pure authorization principle, however, fail under presumed negligence. The
authorization principle ceases to function as a principle of liability when the
account holder engages in presumed negligence. An employer whose trusted
employee issues unauthorized drafts or fraudulently indorses incoming drafts
has no actionable remedy against banks because the employer was presumably
273negligent in trusting the untrustworthy employee. An employer cannot hire a
crook and then externalize the crook-initiated losses to the market. The
employer must be vigilant in hiring employees responsible for processing
negotiable instruments and must have procedures in place to supervise the
activities of such employees. If entrusted employees commit check fraud, the
employer is presumed negligent in hiring and in supervising the employees.
Presumed negligence would not allow employers to shift the loss to the market
in such cases. The bank does not have to prove that the business was
negligent in hiring or supervising the disloyal employee. No such burden is
placed on banks. The bank, however, must show that the employer entrusted the
are "effective." U.C.C. §§ 3-404(b)(2), 3-405(b) (2002). This fiction relieves banks from charges
of conversion and breach of warranties.
270. Lipman & McGraw, supra note 267.
271. U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 1 (2002).
272. Here, "forged check" means both checks with forged indorsements as well as checks
with the drawer's fraudulent signature. There are around 500 million checks forged annually. See
National Check Fraud Center, supra note 267. This loss, however, is not all due to employee fraud.
273. U.C.C. § 3-404 cmt. 2 (discussing cases where corporate treasurer or other entrusted
officers stole outgoing checks); U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt. 3 (discussing cases where employee entrusted
with incoming checks stole them).
274. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 45, § 16-4, at 78.
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employee to indorse incoming drafts, or that the employer empowered the• • 1 ,. 275
employee to issue outgoing drafts.
The allocation of loss to businesses for employee fraud is fair and efficient.
It is fair because employers who hire deceitful employees must accept
responsibility for the employees' acts. It is efficient because employers can
improve hiring practices with minimal costs to screen out dishonest employees
and can bond employees entrusted with negotiable instruments. For a small
276premium, employers can also insure against fraud. If the burden of employee
fraud is shifted to merchants or banks, stiff criminal laws may have to be
enacted to deter fraud. However, no criminal law can reverse the loss of money.
The allocation of loss must still be determined. It would be unfair and
inefficient to turn the responsibility of employee fraud over to the market or to
the banking industry. It would be unfair because merchants and banks would
pay for the dubious hiring practices of businesses. It would be inefficient
because merchants and banks would spend huge resources in terms of
transaction costs to detect and abort payment frauds committed in the privacy of
business.
The EFTA includes no provisions addressing employee fraud. Any such
provisions are beyond the scope of EFTA because electronic fund transfers, as
defined by the EFTA, are confined to natural persons, called consumers.277
Even natural persons making business electronic payments do not fall under the
EFTA, for the law is limited to consumer accounts established primarily for
278personal, family, or household purposes. Juridical persons, such as
corporations, making electronic payments for business purposes are, therefore,
excluded from the EFTA.279
275. U.C.C. §§ 3-404, 3-405(b). The fraudulent indorsement must be made by an employee
entrusted with the instrument. U.C.C. § 3-405(b).
276. See Robert M. Horkovich et al., Insurance Coverage fbr Employee Theft Losses: A
Policyholder Primer on Commonly Litigated Issues, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 365 & n.4 (1999).
277. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(5) (2006).
278. § 1693a(2).
279. Wire transfers between businesses or financial institutions, regulated under Article 4A
of the UCC, seem to function under the principle of presumed negligence, as the following analysis
shows. In maintaining the security procedure for the verification of payment orders, banks are
required to train its employees in the security procedure. U.C.C. 4A-203 cmt. 3 (1989). The trained
employee handling payment orders "test[s]" whether the payment order complies with various
steps of the security procedure. Id. If the employee responsible for the payment order breaches the
security procedure or does not carefully handle the payment order, "the bank is responsible for the
acts of these employees." Id. Furthermore, the bank is responsible if it did not comply with the
customer's instructions-regarding the authorized account from which funds can be transferred or
the list of authorized beneficiaries of payment orders-which the customer has furnished the bank.
Id. If the bank, in processing payment orders, fails to comply with security procedures or otherwise
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Despite the narrow scope of the EFTA, a concept analogous to employee
fraud may be read into the EFTA law. The EFTA allows a consumer to
authorize another person to make electronic fund transfers in the consumer's
account. 28° This authorization is evident when the authorized person is
furnished with the card, code, or other means of access to the consumer's
account. 28 1 This type of authorization, however, is subject to termination. 2 82 The
consumer must notify the relevant financial institution that electronic fund
transfers by such other person are no longer authorized.283 If the consumer
terminates the authority of such other person to make electronic fund transfers
in the consumer's account but fails to provide the notice of termination to the
financial institution, the consumer's conduct falls under presumed
284negligence. The consumer is held responsible for all electronic fund transfers
that the person equipped with the card or the code has made after the
285termination of authorization.
b. Duty to Discover and Report
Presumed negligence imposes a duty on account holders to discover and
report alterations and forged checks to the payor bank within a prescribed
period after receiving the periodic account statement. 286 Negligence is presumed
if the account holder fails to discover and report unauthorized payments and,
consequently, the account holder is held responsible for the loss. The bank is
saddled with no burden to prove the account holder's negligence in not
discovering and reporting alterations and forgeries. The mere failure to report
reasonably discoverable unauthorized payments within the prescribed period
shifts the loss to the account holder, provided the payor bank itself has not been





284. Id. The consumer's failure to notify the financial institution may be viewed as
presumed negligence.
285. Id. § 1693g(a).
286. U.C.C. § 4-406(c) (2002). This section requires that the account holder exercise
reasonable promptness in examining the statement. A period of thirty days has been fixed for
reporting unauthorized payments made by the same wrongdoer. U.C.C. § 4-406(d)(2).
287. The duty to discover unauthorized payments is not absolute, but is based on
reasonableness. If unauthorized payments cannot be reasonably discovered, the account holder
breaches no duty. U.C.C. § 4-406(c). What constitutes reasonable discovery is a question of fact
and is decided on a case-by-case basis. U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 1.
288. Again, the NIL adopts comparative negligence. See supra text accompanying notes
241-45. However, the account holder must prove the bank's negligence, that is, the breach of
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precluding the account holder's argument that alterations and forgeries
constitute unauthorized payments.
Similar to the NIL, the EFTA imposes a duty to discover and report
289unauthorized transfers to the relevant financial institution. The EFTA gives
the consumer a prescribed period to examine the periodic account statement and
to report unauthorized transfers or account errors. 29 If the consumer fails to
report, the consumer is liable for the losses that the financial institution would
not have otherwise suffered. 29 1 Deviating from the NIL, however, the EFTA
places the burden on the financial institution to show that the disputed transfers
were unauthorized. 2 92 Most important, the consumer liability for not reporting
unauthorized transfers could exceed the $500 limit set for not reporting the loss
293 294or theft of a card. Though the law is unclear, the consumer's liability under
EFTA appears to be similar to that of the account holder's unlimited liability
under the NIL.295
No theoretical basis exists for imposing unlimited liability on account
holders under the NIL but only fixed liability on account holders under the
EFTA. In each case, the account holder has failed to discover and report
unauthorized payments apparent on the periodic account statement. In each
case, presumed negligence is similar. In each case, it might be the same person
operating the same account, using exclusively paper payments for one billing
ordinary care as practiced by banks in the relevant locality. See U.C.C. §§ 3-103, 4-406(e)
(explaining that the definition of ordinary care is local).
289. 15 U.S.C. § 1693f (2006). An unauthorized electronic fund transfer is an error.
§ 1693f(t)(1).
290. § 1693f(a). The consumer must report errors within sixty days after the financial
institution has transmitted the statement. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. § 1693g(b).
293. Id. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1693f, if the consumer fails to report unauthorized transfers
within sixty days, the liability could be unlimited, at least up to the amount of the account. See Gail
Hillebrand, Be/bre the Grand Rethinking: Five Things to Do with Payments Law and Ten
Principles to Guide New Payment Products and New Payments Law, 83 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 769,
776 (2008).
294. There seems to be some incompatibility between § 1693f and § 1693g because the
former section places a maximum liability of $500, whereas the latter seems to place an unlimited
liability. A pro-consumer court, however, may interpret § 1693g to override § 1693f, though no
case has raised or resolved the incompatibility. One court came close to upholding § 1693g, but the
court failed to take into account § 1693f. See Heritage Bank v. Lovett, 613 N.W.2d 652, 654 (Iowa
2000) ("[T]he loss was increased as a result of a delay by the depositor in reporting either a stolen
ATM card or an unauthorized entry on a statement that the bank has sent to the depositor. Even in
such instances, however, the bank may not debit the depositor's account for more than $500."
(emphasis added)).
295. See Peters v. Riggs Nat'l Bank N.A., 942 A.2d 1163, 1172 n.9 (D.C. 2008) (comparing
EFTA liability with liability for using checks). The analysis in Peters is inadequate because the
court did not discuss the possible conflict between § 1683f and § 1693g.
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period and exclusively electronic fund transfers for the next. But the person's
liability for presumed negligence would vary from one billing period to the
next. This differential outcome seems iniquitous and arbitrary.
Despite having no theoretical justification, a practical argument may shore
up uneven loss allocation under the two payment systems. Since both
consumers and businesses make payments under the NIL, the amount of money
296transferred by means of drafts can be large. A single business draft can
transfer millions of dollars. By contrast, electronic transfers in consumer
accounts are relatively small in amount.29 7 Many consumer accounts may not
even transfer $500 in a single billing period. The banking system can absorb
losses beyond the deductable $500 cap in consumer accounts. But a parallel
$500 cap under the NIL-where millions of dollars are transferred in business
accounts each day-would drain huge resources from the banking industry.
If consumer protection is a desirable goal, as it assuredly is, negotiable
instruments can be harmonized with electronic payments by creating a liability
cap of $500 per periodic statement for consumer accounts maintained for
personal, family, or household purposes-regardless of whether funds are
transferred electronically or by means of paper devices. This cap for presumed
negligence would be unavailable for business accounts. In addition to the
liability cap, the duty to discover and report unauthorized payments could also
be harmonized by providing similar standards of discovery, a prescribed period
for such discovery, and the same burden of proof.
Suppose, on the other hand, the law, policy, or market aims at substituting
paper fund transfers with electronic fund transfers. The existing incentives
tilting in favor of electronic transfer would eventually convince rational
consumers that they should transfer funds electronically. Electronic transfers
confer the benefits of limited liability for presumed negligence, shift the burden
of proof to financial institutions, and arguably bypass the unlimited liability
under the NIL. Regardless of these advantages, not all consumers have the
transfer skills and the electronic access needed to complete electronic
298transfers. In its present form, therefore, the law of electronic fund transfers
favors computer savvy consumers who also know the comparative benefits of
payment systems and therefore elect electronic fund transfers over paper fund
transfers to minimize liability.
296. A bank, for example, may receive millions of payments in the form of checks from
consumers and corporations. See Weber Leicht Gohr & Assocs. v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., No.
97-3039-FT, 1998 WL 313505, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. June 16, 1998).
297. Patricia Brumfield Fry, Basic Concepts in Article 4A: Scope and Definitions, 45 BuS.
LAW. 1401, 1404, n.17 (1990) (quoting Wholesale Wire Transfer Memorandum from Professors
William D. Warren & Robert L. Jordan to the Drafting Committee on Amendments to Uniform
Commercial Code-Current Payment Methods (Mar. 25, 1986)).
298. See Barr, supra note 17, at 123.
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2. Credit Cards
Presumed negligence has an anemic presence in the law of credit cards.
Presumed negligence offers guidance when a cardholder authorizes another
person to charge the card, but the person exceeds the use limit that the
cardholder has fixed. 2 99 The law holds the cardholder responsible for all charges
that a person makes with the cardholder's actual, implied, or apparent
authority: As discussed in Part Il.C, few courts discharge the liability of a
cardholder who voluntarily delivers the card to a nominated person but places a
limit on the person's use.:3 1 Merchants and financial institutions cannot be
encumbered with the burden of supervising nominated card bearers for use
limits. The cardholder breaches the care principle when the cardholder delivers
the card to an untrustworthy person who does not observe use limits that the
cardholder has established. Therefore, regardless of both use limits and the
authorization principle, presumed negligence provides a legally defensible basis
to allocate losses to the cardholder for charges that the nominated card bearer
has made.
Unlike electronic fund transfers, credit cards are not confined to natural
persons for personal, family, or household purposes. Organizations and
businesses can also be cardholders. Credit cards are more like negotiable
instruments that can be used for both consumer and business purposes. Despite
this similarity with negotiable instruments, the law of credit cards carries no
provisions for employee fraud. Under the NIL, as discussed above, the
employer takes the loss if the entrusted employee obtains payments by making• • • 302
forged or fraudulent indorsements on instruments. The law of credit cards
does impose liability on the employer for charges made by an employee who
303has actual, implied, or apparent authority to use the card: This source of
liability, however, flows from the authorization principle and not from
presumed negligence.
One could argue that the vast agency doctrine of actual, implied, and




299. The use limit is distinguishable from the credit limit. Credit limit on a card is set by the
issuer whereas use limit is set by the cardholder. Card issuers have mechanisms in place to monitor
that the cardholder does not exceed the credit limit so that a charge over the credit limit will not be
approved.
300. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(o) (2006).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 209-11.
302. See supra Part II.B. l.a.
303. See 15 U.S.C. § 1645 (2006).
304. See, e.g., Fifth Third Bank/Visa v. Gilbert, 478 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Ohio Mun. Ct.
1984) (upholding the agency principle of authority); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d
73, 75 (Utah 1983) (discussing apparent authority).
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Even if the employer has granted no actual authority to an employee to use the
company card, the employer is nonetheless liable for credit card charges that the
employee may make under the umbrella of apparent authority.:3 5 Unlike actual
and implied authority, "apparent authority exists entirely apart from the
principal's manifestations of consent to the agent." 30 6 When the employer
voluntarily delivers the card to the employee for making certain charges,
merchants may believe that the employee has the apparent authority to charge
the card for additional purchases as well. The company cannot be allowed to
externalize its employee-caused losses to merchants or to financial institutions.
This outcome, though perfectly defensible under the agency precept of
apparent authority, can be articulated with equal force under the principle of
presumed negligence by arguing that the delivery of a company card to a
dishonest employee is a breach of ordinary care. Therefore, the employer must
suffer credit card losses that its dishonest employee causes without actual or
implied authority. Policy also dictates that it would be more efficient for
employers to screen which employees can be trusted with company cards than
for the market to second-guess whether the employee holding the company card
lacks the authority to use the card at all or lacks the authority to use it beyond a
certain limit. 308 The market cannot micromanage the uses of company cards by
the company's employees. To minimize losses, employers can obtain insurance
to guard against disloyal employees who would misuse company credit cards.:
3 9
The law of credit cards imposes no duty on cardholders to discover and
report unauthorized charges. The law does furnish a method to report billing
errors within a prescribed period after the cardholder receives the periodic
account statement. 310 If the billing error occurred as asserted, the card issuer
removes the disputed amount and related charges from the cardholder's
account. 311 By implication, the cardholder is responsible for billing errors if the
cardholder fails to provide to the card issuer a written notice of such errors
312within the prescribed period. If unauthorized charges were to be included in
the definition of billing errors, the law of credit cards would be similar to that of
negotiable instruments. Just as account holders are precluded from contesting
alterations and forged checks after the expiration of the prescribed period,31 3 the
credit cardholders should be under a similar obligation of presumed negligence.
305. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (2006).
306. Towers World Airways v. PfIH Aviation Sys., Inc., 933 F.2d 174,177 (2d Cir. 1991).
307. Martin v. Am. Express, Inc., 361 So. 2d 597, 600 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978).
308. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 45, § 16-4, at 78.
309. See supra text accompanying note 276.
310. 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a) (2006).
311. Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(e) (2008).
312. § 1666(a).
313. U.C.C. § 4-406(d) (2002).
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However, the question remains whether unauthorized charges shown on the
periodic statement of a credit card account constitute billing errors and are
therefore subject to the duty of discovery and reporting.314 No explicit text in
any statute or federal regulation so provides. The courts differ. One federal
court of appeals relied on the duty to discover and report under the NIL315 to
hold, on the basis of analogy, that "[a] cardholder's failure to examine credit
card statements that would reveal fraudulent use of the card constitutes a
negligent omission that creates apparent authority for charges that would
otherwise be considered unauthorized under the [law of credit card]."
316
Another federal court of appeals held that "there is no need for a court to look to
[the NIL] to resolve the risk allocation and public policy issues regarding credit
card fraud., 31 7 The credit cardholder is under no duty to discover and report
unauthorized charges under the rules of billing errors. The cardholder's failure
to examine periodic statements results in the loss of the opportunity to correct
billing errors, "not that [the cardholder] forfeits protections against liability for
unauthorized use."'3 18 However, when a cardholder continues to make repeated
payments in full for fraudulent charges made by the same employee, the
cardholder leads the card issuer to believe that the employee has the authority to
use the card.31 9
If the doctrine of presumed negligence is applied to the law of credit cards,
the duty to discover and to report is a more straightforward legal basis to
allocate loss to the cardholder for unauthorized payments. This approach
embraces a uniform standard of presumed negligence for all payment systems.
Moreover, it makes economic sense in that the cardholder incurs minimal costs
in discovering unauthorized payments in periodic account statements and
reporting them to the issuer. Lawmakers should declare that an unauthorized
charge on a credit card is a billing error that must be reported to the creditor-
the card issuer-within the prescribed period. Accordingly, the failure to report
will result in allocating the loss to the cardholder. For purposes of consumer
protection, the loss may be capped at a fixed amount, such as $500, thus
equalizing the law of credit cards with that of electronic fund transfers.
314. The EFTA clearly states that an unauthorized electronic fund transfer is a billing error.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(f)(l) (2006).
315. U.C.C. § 4-406(c).
316. Minskoff v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 98 F.3d 703, 709-10 (2d Cir.
1996).
317. DBI Architects, P.C. v. Am. Express Travel-Related Servs. Co., 388 F.3d 886, 892
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
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IV. WRONGFUL DISHONOR PRINCIPLE
The principle of wrongful dishonor is the third principle of liability.
Whereas the authorization and negligence principles apply to all parties to
payment orders, the principle of wrongful dishonor applies exclusively to
financial institutions that decline payment orders. 32 0 Wrongful dishonor is tied
to the authorization principle. When a bank does not pay a properly payable
payment order, the wrongful dishonor repudiates the customer's authorization.
Wrongful dishonor may also be derived from the torts of negligence and
defamation in that a wrongful dishonor, frequently originating from the bank's
negligence, defames the customer. 32 1 Regardless of the theoretical justification
of the wrongful dishonor principle, a financial institution that wrongfully turns
down an authorized payment order must pay damages to the aggrieved party.
32 2
This is the essence of the wrongful dishonor principle.
Distinguish, however, between lawful and wrongful dishonor. A financial
institution may lawfully turn down a payment order for a variety of reasons,
including where there is insufficiency of funds in the relevant account; 323 the
payment order appears to have been altered or forged; 324 the payee fails to.. .... . 325
provide proper identification;3 the account holder has placed a stop payment
order subsequent to the authorization of payment; 3 26 or the financial institution
is placed under bankruptcy. 32 7 The financial institution suffers no damages for
any lawful dishonor of payment orders. Wrongful dishonor occurs when a
payment order is properly payable, but the financial institution refuses to make
the payment. 32  Wrongful dishonor imposes liability on the financial
320. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1693h (2006) (placing the liability on financial institutions);
U.C.C. § 4-402 (placing the liability on payor bank).
321. Bryan D. Hull, Common Law Negligence and Check Fraud Loss Allocation: Has
Common Law Supplemented or Supplanted the U.C.C.?, 51 OMO ST. L.J. 605, 610 (1990) (citing
U.C.C. § 4-402 cmt. 2 (1987)).
322. The wrongful dishonor remedy is available only to customers and not to payees or
holders. Before the enactment of the NIL, courts were divided over the wrongful dishonor liability
owed to holders. See Michael D. Sabbath, Drawee Bank's Liability .br Wronglid Dishonor: A
Proposed Checkholder Cause ofAction, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 318, 328-29 (1984) (citing Cox v.
National Bank, 100 U.S. 704, 712 (1879); Swope v. Ross, 40 Pa. 186, 188 (1881); B. CLARK & A.
SQLUILLANTE, T-E LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS 28 (1970)
(proposing that the wrongful dishonor remedy be available to payees/holders).
323. U.C.C. § 4-402(c), § 4-402 cmt. 4.
324. U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 1.
325. Banks may adopt this policy for over-the-counter payments of orders papers, that is,
checks issued to payees named on the check. See, e.g., Messing v. Bank of Am., N.A., 821 A.2d
22, 26 (Md. 2003) (discussing that the bank asked for identification).
326. U.C.C. § 4-403(a).
327. U.C.C. § 4-216.
328. U.C.C. § 4-402(a).
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• • 329institution. The following discussion contrasts the application of the wrongful
dishonor principle to negotiable instruments, electronic fund transfers, and
credit card transactions.
A. Negotiable Instruments and Electronic Fund Transfers
Both the NIL and the EFTA explicitly recognize the wrongful dishonor
principle. However, the rules of the two systems are not the same. The
variation in rules, as discussed below, is to a large extent unwarranted. The
variation presupposes certain market conditions that may no longer be relevant.
Part of the variation comes from the fact that negotiable instruments are paper
devices, whereas electronic fund transfers are electronic orders. The medium of
a payment order, whether paper or electronic, imposes its own logistical
concerns in that paper-based checks may be displaced and computers may fail
to process electronic orders. Yet the liability for wrongful dishonor need not
vary according to the medium containing the payment order.
Regardless of the choice of medium, an account holder's authorized
payment order must not be rejected for wrongful reasons. This point, however,
is delicate and needs explanation. As a general rule, a payor bank is under no
obligation to honor every payment order. No unqualified obligation to honor
payment orders is placed on the payor bank since the bank may have valid
reasons to dishonor payments. 33 1 Yet the obligation comes into existence when
a properly payable payment order is presented to the payor bank. The key
trigger is the "properly payable" part of the payment order. The account
holder's unassailable authorization is the first requirement of a properly payable
payment order.332 Furthermore, the order is free of faults, such as alteration and
forgery, and the account holder has sufficient credit with the bank to make the
payment. 333 When all these conditions coalesce, a properly payable payment
order cannot be lawfully dishonored. If the transaction is authorized, the payor
bank is liable for wrongful dishonor.334 To this extent, the NL and the EFTA
329. 15 U.S.C. § 1693h(a) (2006); U.C.C. § 4-402.
330. § 1693h(a); U.C.C. § 4-402. UCC Article 4A, however, does not seem to recognize the
concept of wrongful dishonor. It is conceivable though, that under specific circumstances-where
the customer suffers losses due to wrongful dishonor of a payment order made under UCC section
4A-202-the customer may be entitled to damages. I have not been able to find a case where a
court has awarded damages for the wrongful dishonor of a payment order under UCC Article 4A.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 323-27.
332. A stop payment order takes away the account holder's authorization, and the payment
order is no longer properly payable. See U.C.C. § 4-403.
333. Sufficient credit includes any draft facility that the account holder has contracted with
the payor bank.
334. § 1693h(a); U.C.C. § 4-402.
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are in agreement. However, they carry different rules for providing damages to
the aggrieved party.
The NIL and the EFTA both require that damages be proximately caused by
the wrongful dishonor of a payment order. 335 Proximate causation is a natural
and continuous sequence of events under which a prior event produces a
subsequent event, and the subsequent event would not have occurred but for the
prior event.336 The sequence is continuous when no other independent cause
intervenes to direct or affect the chain of causation. 337 An account holder who
suffers arrest or prosecution for the wrongful dishonor of a payment order may
show proximate causation between the events. Proximate causation in each case
of wrongful dishonor is a question of fact.338 For example, it was a question of
fact for the jury to determine whether the wrongful dishonor of numerous
checks of a motor dealership proximately caused, as claimed, negative business
effects to the extent that the employee morale dropped, good salespeople quit,
parts suppliers called for cash payments on delivery, and lenders raised interest
rates-all of these effects compounding the dealership's financial woes.
3 39
The measure of damages for wrongful dishonor, however, varies under the
two payment systems. The NIL requires the account holder to prove actual
damages; 340 therefore, damages per se are unavailable. The proof requirement
has rejected the common law action for "slander of credit"-under which
traders could recover substantial damages for wrongful dishonor without
showing any actual harm. 341 Now all account holders, consumers and businesses,. 342
alike, must prove actual injury to demand monetary compensation: Compared
to the NIL, the EFTA is textually generous as it allows for all damages
proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor and does not demand that
damages be actual or proved. The EFTA's textual generosity, however, is
335. 15 U.S.C. § 1693h; U.C.C. § 4-402(b).
336. Terry v. Nuvell Credit Corp., No. Civ-06-0851-F, 2007 WL 2746919, at *4 (W.D.
Okla. Sept. 20, 2007).
337. Id.
338. U.C.C. § 4-402 cmt. 3. The determination of proximate causation is left to the jury
given the unique nature of inquiry in each case. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d
666, 668 (N.Y. 1980).
339. Goldsmith Motors Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 838 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632-33 (App. Div. 2007).
340. U.C.C. § 4-402(b).
341. Rolin v. Stewart, (1854) 139 Eng. Rep. 245, 246 (C.B.) (invoking the concept of
defamation to pin responsibility on the bank that refused to pay a properly payable check),
discussed in Comment, The Measure of Damages fbr Wronglid Dishonor, 23 U. Cmi. L. REV. 481,
484-85 (1956).
342. See Wasp Oil, Inc. v. Ark. Oil & Gas, Inc., 658 S.W.2d 397, 402 (Ark. 1983) (holding
that speculative and conjectural damages may not be allowed but "recovery will not be denied
merely because the damages cannot be determined with exactness" (citations omitted)). Mental
suffering can be compensated under the NIL, however, mental injury must be proved.
343. 15 U.S.C. § 1693h(a) (2006).
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elusive. Because the EFTA is not common law, it cannot be presumed to offer
damages per se. 344 For all damages, the EFTA requires proximate causation
between the wrongful dishonor and the injury. 345 Damages per se, by definition,
have nothing to do with proximate causation. 34 6 Damages are simply presumed.
However, the EFTA text refrains from demanding that the actual damages be
347proved. This omission does not mean that the EFTA allows damages per se.
Consistency demands that, under both payment systems, the plaintiff prove
proximately caused damages to obtain compensatory relief.
348
The EFTA provides specified exceptions under which the wrongful
dishonor is not compensated. Some of these exceptions are similar to the ones
available under the NIL. 34 9 Others are not. Under the EFTA, for example, a
bank is not liable for damages if an act of God or a technical malfunction causes
the wrongful dishonor. 35 Given that bank processes are automated for checks as
well as for electronic transfers, the technical malfunction defense 351 should be
available for all payment orders. Likewise, an act of God defense for the
wrongful dishonor should be available to financial institutions whether the
344. Because damages per se were available to merchants and traders, the EFTA cannot
offer such damages. See U.C.C. § 4-402 cmt. I (stating that the trader rule has been abolished).
Note that the EFTA is confined to consumer transfers and does not apply to business transfers that
are regulated under UCC Article 4A.
345. § 1693h(a).
346. See, e.g., Maietta Constr., Inc. v. Wainwright, 847 A.2d 1169, 1174 (Me. 2004)
(discussing that damages per se are not the same as actual damages).
347. § 1693h(a).
348. The NIL allows punitive damages when wrongful dishonor is malicious and willful.
See Twin City Bank v. Isaacs, 672 S.W.2d 651, 653-54 (Ark. 1984). Likewise, punitive damages
should be awarded under the EFTA if electronic fund transfers were dishonored out of oppression,
malice, or any similar motive. The purpose of punitive damages is to warn financial institutions
that proper payment orders must not be dishonored out of spite against the account holder.
Interpersonal vindictiveness should have no place under any payment system, whether it is cash-
based or credit-based, or whether payments orders are processed through a tangible or an
intangible medium. See generally Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92
IOWA L. REV. 957, 1009 (2007) (arguing that one purpose of punitive damages is to deter insulting
and humiliating behavior).
349. Insufficiency of funds, payment orders exceeding an established credit limit
(overdraft), judicial encumbrances, or administrative encumbrances on the account are valid bases
to dishonor payment orders. See § 1693h(a) (stating that transfers are subject to legal processes and
other encumbrances); U.C.C. § 4-303(a) (stating that payments are subject to legal process, setoff,
and stop payment orders).
350. § 1693h(b)(l)-(2). These defenses presuppose that the bank's conduct and automated
processes are in line with the ordinary care practiced in the banking industry. See § 1693h(c)
(removing the bona fide error defense when "the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to
avoid such error" were not present).
351. § 1693h(b)(2) (providing a defense when the "failure to act resulted from a technical
malfunction which was known to the customer"). This defense may be denied to a bank that has
failed to maintain an automation system compliant with the industry standards.
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payment order is initiated electronically or by means of paper. Such
systemization of defenses will yield a more rational, efficient, and just law of
wrongful dishonor.
B. Credit Cards
In 1971, the Supreme Court of South Carolina declared that it knew of "no
case dealing with the wrongful dishonor of a credit card .... Nor has any case
been cited or come to our attention which deals with the respective rights, duties
and liabilities of the parties." 352 The court, however, "refrain[ed] from deciding
[this] question of novel impression."3 53 In 1984, a federal court expressed
sympathy toward a cardholder whose credit card, upon the issuer's instruction,
was confiscated and destroyed when the cardholder tried to pay for a wedding
anniversary dinner: 4 However the federal court did not embrace the concept of
wrongful dishonor. 355 The federal law of credit cards that Congress legislated
during the period between these two cases is silent on the wrongful dishonor of
credit cards. As of the writing of this Article, no state or federal case raises or
resolves the question of wrongful dishonor of credit cards.
As noted previously, not every dishonor of a payment order is wrongful.
A card issuer may dishonor a payment order when the cardholder has exceeded
an established credit limit, the order appears to be unauthorized, the electronic
terminal has insufficient cash to complete the transaction, or the cardholder has
defaulted in paying previous charges. 357 Likewise, the dishonor of credit card
orders is excusable if an act of God or a technical malfunction prevents the
completion of the order. 358 To avoid wrongful dishonor liability, however, card
issuers must maintain a customary technical infrastructure and take necessary
preventive measures against the foreseeable forces of nature.
A card issuer wrongfully dishonors a credit card charge when the charge is
properly payable. A properly payable charge means that the cardholder or the
authorized card bearer has used the card for a lawful purpose to order payment
within the credit limit set for the card.359 The wrongful dishonor may be charge-
352. Hill v. Am. Express Co., 257 S.C. 86, 89, 184 S.E.2d 115, 116 (1971).
353. Id.
354. Gray v. Am. Express Co., 743 F.2d 10, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The plaintiff in this case
was a lawyer determined to seek a remedy against wrongful dishonor. The court praised the
plaintiff for his tenacity "beyond the professional custom" to resist the abusive and lengthy
discovery process of a resourceful card issuer. Id. at 20.
355. Id.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 349-51.
357. 15 U.S.C. § 1693h(a) (2006).
358. § 1693h(b).
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specific or card-specific. When a properly payable charge is dishonored without
cancellation of the card, the wrongful dishonor is charge-specific. When the
issuer cancels the card depriving the cardholder of the credit facility, the
wrongful dishonor is card-specific. The card-specific wrongful dishonor may
create serious consequential injury to the cardholder, as it completely precludes
the cardholder from using the contractual credit. In some cases, the charge-
specific wrongful dishonor may result in serious monetary, mental, and
reputational injury.
It is unclear why the law of credit cards excludes the concept of wrongful
dishonor. One argument in support of exclusion draws from the distinction
between what could be termed "my money" and "[their] money. ' 36° The money
in an account holder's checking account is my money, whereas the credit in a
cardholder's account is their money, that is, the lender's money. 361 Therefore,
when a bank dishonors a payment order drawn on my money, the bank is liable
for wrongful dishonor. However, no action is allowed when the lender refuses
to comply with a payment order out of their money. 362 Since a credit card draws
on their money and not my money, the argument goes, the law of credit cards
rightfully excludes the wrongful dishonor principle.
The distinction between my money and their money is deceptive. It
misconceives the relationship between the account holder and the bank. Money
kept in safe deposits in banks must not be confused with money deposited with• 1 • 364
banks in checking or other accounts. Safe deposits offer a storage facility forkeeping valuables, including jewelry and cash. The bank acts as the bailee that
360. Franklin M. Fisher, Economic Analysis and "Bright-Line" Tests, 4 J. COMPETITION L.




363. During the last several years, some students in my payment systems classes have made
this argument to defend the absence of the wrongful dishonor principle in the law of credit cards.
364. See 2 FREDRICK POLLOCK & FREDRIC WILLIAM MAILTLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 151 (1898) (demonstrating that "money has no ear-mark"). In the 18th century in
the United States, a legal confusion persisted regarding bank liability for deposits of specie. Khan,
supra note 2, at 412 n.92. The depositors viewed the bank as a warehouse for keeping gold and
silver coins and wanted to draw out the same coins they had deposited. Id. Notably, Alexander
Hamilton, the Secretary of Treasury, believed that the specie deposited in a bank was the
customer's earmarked property. Id. Banks resisted this view of liability, which is anchored in the
law of bailment. They preferred the legal doctrine under which depositors were the bank's
creditors. This view, which ultimately prevailed, changed the notion of money as earmarked
property. Id. In Thompson v. Riggs, 72 U.S. 663 (1866), the United States Supreme Court upheld
the view that, when customers deposit money in the bank, "the title to the money passes to the
bank and the latter becomes the debtor of the [customer] to that amount." Id. at 680. This footnote
is adapted from a footnote in another article that I authored. Ali Khan, The Evolution ofMoney: A
Story q/tConstitutional Nullilication, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 393, 412 n.92 (1999).
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must return the specified items. 365 However, when the account holder deposits
funds in a checking or savings account, the account holder is entitled to an
amount equal to the amount deposited. With respect to accounts, the bank is not
a bailee but a debtor. 366 The account holder is the creditor. When a bank extends
a line of credit to an account holder, whether in the form of overdraft facility in
a checking account or revolving credit in a credit card account, the bank
obligates itself to comply with the account holder's authorized payment orders.
Thus, no meaningful distinction separates an overdraft account from a credit
account. In both cases, the bank lends money to the account holder and may
have undertaken a contractual obligation to pay authorized orders.
367
Even if the bank offers no overdraft facility, the distinction between a
checking account and a credit card account is inconsequential for purposes of
wrongful dishonor. By extending a contract-based line of credit, the card issuer
creates market expectations that the issuer will pay the cardholder's authorized
charges. The cardholder uses the card in contractual reliance that the authorized
charges will not be dishonored. The cardholder's lawful uses of the credit card,
therefore, cannot be arbitrarily dismissed without notice or good reason. If the
credit card charge is properly payable, no good reason distinguishes the account
holder's reliance on a checking account from the cardholder's reliance on a
credit card account to pay for goods and services.
Consistent with the NIL and the EFTA, the law of credit cards may require
that the plaintiff's injury be proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor of a
credit card charge or a card cancellation. The cardholder may yet be saddled
with the burden of proof for actual damages. Still, damages per se for the
wrongful cancellation of the credit card may not be granted. Though the proof
requirement places a formidable burden on cardholders, many of whom have
modest means of income and cannot afford to litigate against resourceful banks,
consistency requires that the cardholder shoulder the burden of proof of actual
damages. Consumer protection laws, however, may exempt consumers from
the burden of proof requirement and shift the burden to card issuers. This
shifting of the burden of proof would require banks to establish that the
wrongful dishonor was not the proximate cause of the cardholder's injury.
Businesses, on the other hand, need not be exempted from the burden of proof.
This bifurcation in the placement of the burden of proof is consistent with the
notion of fairness and the meaningful realization of consumer rights.
365. See Farnum v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 168 A.2d 168, 170 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1960).
366. Thompson, 72 U.S. at 680.
367. See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. Jarczyk, 268 B.R. 17, 22 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding a
unilateral contract where the issuing bank's performance of the contract is reimbursement to the
merchant).
368. This proposal is consistent with 15 U.S.C. § 1693h(a) and UCC section 4-402.
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V. PRTNCTPLED FRAMEWORK
This Part interweaves the application of the three principles discussed
above into a coherent whole. In doing so, it offers a principled framework that
lawmakers, judges, and other legal professionals may consult in legislating
payment rules, deciding payment disputes, and determining the future evolution
of payment services. In addition to reforming payment laws in the United
States, the proposed framework offers a universal model that other jurisdictions
may also use to regularize national payment systems. Markedly, an international
payment system can be realized in light of the framework discussed below.
A. Account Orders
Regardless of the type of payment system, an account order is central to
payment transactions. An account order instructs a financial institution to debit
or to credit a specified amount in a designated account.369 An account order is
either a credit order or a debit order. 370 An account order is a credit order when
the order adds credit to the account; 371 it is a debit order when the order
subtracts credit from the account.372 The designated account may be a
conventional credit account, such as a checking account or a credit card
account. It could be an ad hoc account,373 such as a letter of credit account,
opened for making a limited number of debit orders. An ad hoc account is
almost always terminated on a definite expiration date. By contrast, the
conventional account is a revolving account-undergoing credit and debit
transactions-which the account holder continues to use for an indefinite
period. An account, conventional or ad hoc, must have sufficient credit at the
time the bank receives a debit order. However, a credit order that adds available
funds to the account may undergo fewer restrictions.
Generally, a debit order involves three parties. The account holder that
initiates the debit order is the first party, the payee is the second, and the payor
bank the third. More parties may be involved if an intermediary financial
369. The account order may pay periodic bills, receive cash from a checking or savings
account, or transfer funds to another person or account.
370. Robert C. Effros, A Banker's Primer on the Law q/ Electronic Funds Tran sftrs, 105
BANKING L.J. 510, 510 (1988).
371. Depositing a paycheck in a checking account, for example, is a credit order.
372. Withdrawing cash from a checking account, for example, is a debit order.
373. A certificate of deposit comes under the definition of an ad hoc account.
374. The payments made to the credit card account replenish the credit for future use
whereas payments made to the checking account replenish the credit for future withdrawals or
payments.
375. See Effros, supra note 370.
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institution-such as the depositary bank in the case of checks, or the merchant's
bank in the case of credit card charges-processes the debit order. 376 When an
account holder withdraws funds, the debit order involves only two parties: the
account holder and the payor bank. In most cases, a credit order may involve
only the account holder and the bank. The person adding credit to the account
may be a third party, such as the account holder's employer, who may
electronically transfer funds to the account holder's account. In all cases, an
account order, whether debit or credit, involves the bank where the account
holder maintains the designated account.
377
Theoretically, account orders are medium-neutral. An account holder may
initiate an account order with a paper instrument, such as a check or a deposit
slip. An account holder may also initiate and process the order electronically or
by any other method. The methods of receiving credit and debit account orders
must be left to the market that constantly searches for accuracy, speed, and
efficiency. A technologically advanced jurisdiction, in which account holders
use the Internet, may allow electronic fund transfers. Another jurisdiction may
prefer a tangible medium, such as paper, for processing account orders. Some
account holders may prefer one medium over the other. Convenience and
market conditions demand that account holders be given multiple methods of
initiating account orders. To some extent, however, the automation for
processing account orders is inevitable regardless of the medium by which the
account holder initiates the order.
378
The market may provide incentives-or disincentives-to discriminate
against certain types of payment services. For example, the market may impose
a surcharge for the use of credit cards, consequently making credit card
transactions expensive. Some merchants may not accept checks. The market
may embrace electronic transfers as the preferred method of payment. Ideally,
376. Id.
377. See id. at 510-11. A promissory note may not be an account order, but it might be
subsumed in the definition of account order if the note is paid through the bank, or the note is paid
by the bank. In spite of this, the NIL distinguishes a note from an order because a note is an
undertaking to pay, whereas an order is an instruction to a third party-often a bank-to pay the
order. U.C.C. § 3-103(8), (12) (2002). These distinctions may be abandoned if the payment is to be
made by or at the bank.
378. See Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act of 2003 (Check 21 Act), 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5001-5018 (2006) (allowing check truncation, innovation in check collection, and improving
the overall efficiency of payment systems); see also Steven L. Harris, Introduction to Rethinking
Payments Law, 83 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 477, 492 (2008) (noting that with the legislation of the
Check 21 Act, electronics are being used for the entire check collection process).
379. Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 951, 969 n.68
(2008) (citing ITM RESEARCH, THE ABOLITION OF THE No-DISCRIMINATION RULE 7-9 (2000),
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/29373/studies/netheriands/eport.pd) (noting
that merchants are unaware of the rule that they can surcharge or discount a credit card payment).
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the law should not intervene to subvert or inhibit competition between diverse
payment services and should let the market sort out the competition in a fair and
open manner. However, the law must intervene to curb abuses and predatory
practices associated with payment services.
380
B. Authorization Principle
Account orders are subject to the authorization principle. Debit orders must..... . . . 381
specifically comply with the authorization principle: As a general principle,
an unauthorized debit order is not properly payable. 3 2 Authorization implies
383that the debit order is not forged or altered. If the debit order is altered, the
account holder is liable for the original amount.384 In the absence of negligence,
the account holder is not liable for forged or fraudulent debit orders: An
account holder may authorize an agent, employee, or any other representative to
initiate debit orders. Such orders are binding on the account holder.
3 7
Accordingly, an account holder company is liable for debit orders that an
authorized employee charges to the account. An account holder may at any time
ratify an otherwise unauthorized account order.
3
8
A debit order may be authorized by any means, including signature, code,
personal identification number, or any other method acceptable to the bank.
Signature, as a classical method of authorization, presupposes a tangible
medium to convey the account order, though the invention of the digital
signature has freed the concept from the tangible medium.:3 9 Since account
orders are not tied to the tangible medium, they may be initiated in any
acceptable medium. Technology may offer new methods of initiating and
380. Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the
Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005) (noting that all levels of government activated
controls when predatory lending practices create a major crisis, such as subprime lending in home
mortgaging).
381. Credit orders may require authorization to prevent criminal liability. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1644(a) (2006) (providing penalties for fraudulent use of credit cards, including lost or stolen
cards). For example, a charity may need to know the identity of the depositor to avoid criminal
sanctions under the national security laws. In most cases, however, depositing funds in an account
does not require preauthorization of the account holder.
382. U.C.C. § 3-403(a).
383. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(41) (1989).
384. U.C.C. § 3-407(c) (2002).
385. U.C.C. § 3-403(a).
386. See U.C.C. § 3-402(a).
387. Id.
388. U.C.C. § 3-403(a).
389. Kalama M. Lui-Kwan, Recent Developments in Digital Signature Legislation and
Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 463, 464 (1999) (noting that a digital signature
suffices to verify the identity of the cardholder).
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verifying the account holder's authorization. Financial institutions are unlikely
to accept a risk-prone or inefficient method of authorization. More specifically,
account holders will not accept a cumbersome or time-consuming method of
authorization. The law may need to continuously evaluate new methods of
authorization to find one that the market prefers, while also offering appropriate
regulation in order to streamline market expectations.
The authorization principle allocates losses to financial institutions by
making them liable for unauthorized orders. Financial institutions are liable for
paying fraudulent and forged checks, unauthorized electronic fund transfers,
and credit card charges debited to stolen and lost credit cards. Banks may insure
these losses.39 They may also transfer some of these losses to account holders
by way of fees that financial institutions charge for processing debit orders,
maintaining accounts, making late payments, and charging higher interests on
loans. While financial institutions distribute losses caused by the authorization
principle to account holders through indirect means, no account holder is
responsible for losses that unauthorized payments cause in a specific account. In
this sense, the authorization principle is communitarian, in that it allows
financial institutions to allocate aggregated losses to the community of account
holders. If losses exceed what the community of account holders will tolerate in
a competitive market, the account holders may require the financial institution
to absorb all or part of the losses.
391
C. Negligence Principle
While authorization imposes liability is a valid principle with respect to
account orders, the negative implication of the authorization principle-no
authorization, no liability-is subject to the negligence principle. Ordinarily, a
person is not liable for an account order unless the person authorizes theS392 T
order: However, the negligence principle intervenes to impose liability on the
person whose negligence substantially contributes to the execution of a forged,
fraudulent, or altered account order. Theoretically, this negligence principle
applies to all account orders regardless of the payment system from which they
originate. More specifically, the negligence principle would apply to negotiable
390. Banks frequently obtain a banker's blanket bond or similar insurance that protects them
against losses from employee fraud, forgery, and criminal acts such as robbery and burglary. Some
states require banks to obtain insurance coverage. See Susan Koehler Sullivan & Teresa Jones, The
Question of Causation in Loan Loss Cases, II FIDELITY L.J. 89, 101-02 (2005).
391. Allocation of'Losses.from Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable Instruments
and the Unifbrm Commercial Code, 62 YALE L.J. 417, 436-39 (1953). Although this Article does
not discuss loss allocation in the case of credit and debit cards, the analysis is sound for loss
allocation in all payment systems.
392. U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (2002).
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instruments, credit card charges, and electronic fund transfers. Needless to say,
no person is liable for a forged, fraudulent, altered, or erroneous account order if
the person exercised ordinary care in initiating, processing, or executing the
account order. In the absence of negligence, no authorization, no liability is a
golden guideline.
The negligence principle requires that the account holder discover and
report any forged, fraudulent, altered, or erroneous debit or credit orders
reflected in the periodic statement that the bank sends to the account holder.
394
The law may require a reasonable statutory period within which the account
holder must discover and report problematic entries. The account holder is
liable for debit orders and accepts the accuracy of credit orders if the account
holder fails to discover and report forgeries, alterations, mistakes, errors, and
other discrepancies in the statement. This application of the negligence
principle, consistent with the cheapest cost avoidance norm, may be enforced
regardless of payment devices used to access the account.
Extending the negligence principle to employers, the principled framework
requires that any account order, debit or credit, that an employee originates
imposes liability on the employer.3 95 The framework operates on the rebuttable
presumption that the employee originating the account order has the requisite
authority. This simple rule makes good economic sense because it does not
externalize fraud that is committed within a business. Otherwise, businesses will
have no incentive to screen and supervise employees who process account
orders. The internalization of employee-sponsored payment losses persuades
businesses to practice care in hiring employees, supervising their activities
related to accounts, and bonding high risk employees. This allocation of loss
safeguards financial institutions from adopting cumbersome processing filters to
do the impossible task of separating good employees from bad employees.
As a general principle, the framework allocates losses to the negligent
account holder. Just as negligence is person-specific, so follows the allocation
of loss. Each negligent account holder is liable for its own negligent losses.
393. The banking industry cannot be allowed to adopt a standard of care that excludes banks
from detecting forged signatures and alterations. Under such a minimalist standard of care, the risk
of forgery and alteration automatically shifts to account holders.
394. This standard of care is fair and efficient for it shifts the lost to the cheapest cost
avoider, the account holder. See supra text accompanying notes 258-60. The duty to discover and
report may be imposed on all account holders regardless of payment devices used to operate the
account. The $50 limit, as in credit cards and electronic transfers, should not apply to minimize
liability under this standard of care.
395. This proposed rule dispenses with the concept of entrusted employee or the employee
with actual, apparent, or implied authority. The employer must be liable for employee fraud. The
banks, however, cannot close their eyes if a fiduciary is blatantly committing fraud or diverting
company funds to a private account. See U.C.C. § 3-307 (2002) (explaining the circumstances
where banks are on notice for a breach of fiduciary duty).
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Hence, the framework's negligence loss allocation is markedly different from
the law of credit cards discussed above, which aggregates losses and distributes
them to the community of cardholders in the form of higher interest rates.
396
The framework would require that the law of credit cards be reviewed to shift
the loss to the negligent cardholder. For both efficiency and consumer
protection purposes, however, the law may introduce the concept of "reverse
deductible"397 -creating a cardholder who is liable for negligent losses above a
prescribed amount.
398
Currently, the law of credit cards does not fully enforce this proposed
framework's loss allocation of the negligence principle. Credit cardholders
know or should know that they are not liable for the negligent safekeeping of
credit cards. If a card is lost or stolen, the law does not inquire whether the
cardholder's negligence caused the card to be lost or stolen. Any charges made
to the lost or stolen credit card are unauthorized charges, regardless of the
cardholder's contributory negligence.399  This impunity creates a false
impression that no credit cardholder is liable for negligence, even though in
practice, the negligent losses are aggregated and distributed to the entire
community of negligent, as well as non-negligent, cardholders. Consequently,
the current law subsidizes negligent cardholders and penalizes non-negligent
cardholders, who all share the negligent losses.
D. Wrongfid Dishonor Principle
The principled framework embraces the wrongful dishonor principle for all
payment systems. The principle exercises lawful pressure on financial
institutions to honor authorized account orders. Orderly and timely payments
are critical for the efficient functioning of financial markets. Furthermore, debit
396. See supra text accompanying note 389.
397. This idea, though beyond the scope of this Article, needs further development. Reverse
deductible would shift a limited loss (for example, $50) per periodic statement to financial
institutions. If negligent losses exceed the deductible, the consumer-account holder would forfeit
the deductible and be held liable for the entire amount. The financial institutions may distribute the
reverse deductible losses to the community of account holders in the guise of fees and interest
rates. The reverse deductible rule is efficient, while it eliminates the transaction costs of enforcing
minor negligent losses against the cardholder. It also encourages cardholders to take better care of
credit cards and to safeguard them from being lost or stolen. The reverse deductible is unavailable
to the cardholder if the loss is intentional, collusive, or fraudulent.
398. This proposal does not weaken the duty to discover and report errors in the periodic
statement. The bank may have good reasons to sue a cardholder whose negligence causes
substantial losses, although the losses have been duly discovered and reported.
399. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (2006) (stating that the maximum liability is capped at $50).
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orders serve as the medium of exchange for the sale of goods and services.
4
00
When authorized payments are dishonored, the market of goods and services is
subject to disruption. Most important, as discussed previously, the wrongful
dishonor of account orders may stain the account holder's credit, resulting in
consequential damages.
40 1
Recognizing the efficiency of the wrongful dishonor principle, the proposed
framework extends the principle to credit card payments. Accordingly, a
financial institution would be liable for actual damages proximately caused by
the wrongful dishonor of a credit card charge, let alone wrongful termination of
a credit card. If a cardholder has not exceeded the credit limit and has been
diligent in paying the bills, there exists no lawful excuse for the card issuer to
decline a lawful charge or to arbitrarily terminate the credit facility. The
financial institutions may be allowed certain defenses, such as an act of God or
a technical malfunction. 40 2 On the other hand, the principled framework
imposes punitive damages on the credit card issuer if the wrongful dishonor is
oppressive or malicious, thus bringing credit cards transactions to a level
playing field with negotiable instruments and electronic fund transfers.
40 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The three principles of authorization, negligence, and wrongful dishonor
constitute a normative theoretical model of payment services, regardless of the
devices-checks, credit cards, or electronic transfers-by which these services
are accessed. Most fundamentally, the authorization principle mandates that
financial institutions provide payment services in accordance with the account
holder's authorization. Reciprocally, the account holder is liable for amounts
that the bank pays in accordance with authorized instructions. The negligence
principle creates exceptions to the authorization principle by holding the
400. Khan, supra note 2, at 441-42 (describing the movement of money through the
intangible medium). I often wonder if money is becoming mere accounting under which numbers
are moved from one account to another.
401. See supra Part IV.B. No law yet exists for the wrongful dishonor of credit card
authorizations.
402. See supra text accompanying note 350.
403. Punitive damages must be available to prevent malicious discrimination against a
cardholder. If an issuer bank wrongfully and maliciously cancels a credit card, the bank must be
held liable for punitive damages. As a result, the principled framework extends the rule of punitive
damages already available for malicious nonpayment of checks. See, e.g., Maxan Curtain Mfg.
Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 646 N.Y.S.2d 701, 702 (App. Div. 1996) (permitting punitive damages
where plaintiff alleged that the bank's vice president "maliciously ordered a bank employee to
dishonor the plaintiff's checks despite the fact that the plaintiff had sufficient funds in its checking
account"). If a financial institution terminates a credit card for factors such as race, religion,
national origin, or language, the case for punitive damages garners more strength.
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negligent party liable for unauthorized payments if the party's negligence
substantially contributes to the loss. The negligence loss is distributed on the
basis of comparative fault. Conversely, in the case of businesses, the employer's
negligence is presumed and loss shifts to the employer if the bank makes a good
faith payment, and the employee has ordered a fraudulent deposit using the
company's authorization setup. This allocation of loss to employers is
consistent with the cheapest cost avoider rule, since employers are best situated
to supervise disloyal employees. Finally, the principle of wrongful dishonor
holds banks liable for the nonpayment of properly payable orders. This principle
promotes an efficient and timely transfer of value, greasing the wheel of
commerce so that merchants can receive prompt payments for goods and
services that they sell to account holders or their authorized representatives. On
the basis of these principles, this Article highlights for consumers and
businesses the comparative advantages and disadvantages of using checks,
credit cards, and electronic payments. Ultimately, the Article recommends a
number of legal reforms to bring diverse payment systems in harmony with the
efficiency and fairness of the principled framework presented in this Article.
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